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Abstract
This paper examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that
nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and
educational choices. Individuals in the model decide when to attend school
and when to move between rms and occupations over the course of their ca-
reer. Workers search for suitable wage and non-pecuniary match values at rms
across occupations given their heterogeneous skill endowments and preferences
for employment in each occupation. Over the course of their careers workers
endogenously accumulate rm and occupation specic human capital that af-
fects wages di¤erently across occupations. The parameters of the model are
estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using data from the 1979 co-
hort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The structural parameter
estimates reveal that both self-selection in occupational choices and mobility
between rms account for a much larger share of total earnings and utility than
the combined e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital. Eliminating
the gains from matching between workers and occupations would reduce total
wages by 30%, eliminating the gains from job search would reduce wages by
19%, and eliminating the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic human capital
on wages would reduce wages by only 2.7%.
Keywords: Occupational Choice, Job Search, Dynamic Discrete Choice,
Human Capital
I would like to thank Steven Stern, John Pepper, and William Johnson for their invaluable
assistance during this project. I would also like to thank Loren Smith, John Bound, and numer-
ous seminar participants for helpful comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge nancial
support for this research provided by the Bankard Fund for Political Economy at the University of
Virginia, and the University of Virginia College of Arts and Sciences. Contact information: Email:
Sullivan.Paul.Joseph@bls.gov. Phone: (202) 691-6593. All views and opinions expressed in this
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
1 Introduction
Over the course of their careers people choose how much education to obtain, which occupations to
work in, and when to move between rms. Despite the interrelated nature of these choices, previous
research has generally examined educational and occupational choices separately from decisions
about job search. Empirical studies of occupational and educational choices are frequently based
on the framework of human capital models, which have taken the form of dynamic programming
models in recent work (Keane and Wolpin 1997, Lee 2005, Lee and Wolpin 2006). In these dynamic
human capital models workers endogenously accumulate education and occupation specic human
capital as they make optimal career choices, but all jobs are identical within an occupation. In
contrast to dynamic human capital models, an extensive job search literature has emphasized
the importance of job matching between workers and rms in determining wages while generally
abstracting away from both occupational choices and human capital accumulation.1 McCall (1990)
and Neal (1999) depart from this trend by developing search models that incorporate occupations,
but these models do not include human capital accumulation.
The goal of this research is to further the understanding of how people make decisions about
educational attainment and employment by estimating a dynamic structural model of career choices
that incorporates the key features of a job search model within a dynamic human capital model
of occupational and educational choices. In the model, forward looking workers choose when to
attend school and when to move between occupations and rms as they maximize their discounted
expected utility. Search frictions such as randomness in job o¤ers and moving costs impede the
optimal allocation of workers across occupations and rms. Over the course of their careers workers
endogenously accumulate general human capital in the form of education as well as occupation and
rm specic human capital. The value of employment varies over the ve occupations in the
1Berkovec and Stern (1991) and Wolpin (1992) develop search models that include rm specic capital but these
models do not incorporate occupational choices.
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economy because workers have heterogeneous skill endowments and preferences for employment
across occupations, and because the e¤ect of human capital on wages varies across occupations.
Workers search for suitable wage and non-pecuniary match values at rms across occupations given
their innate skills and preferences and stock of human capital. Allowing for search based on non-
pecuniary utility generalizes the approach used in many search models which assume that workers
search only for wage match values.2
This paper contributes to a growing literature that demonstrates the value of using dynamic
discrete choice models to study employment and educational choices over the career. Most relevant
to the work presented here are the dynamic human capital models developed by Keane and Wolpin
(1997, 2001) and dynamic structural models such as Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Belzil and
Hansen (2002) that focus on the endogenous accumulation of education. The model developed in
this paper expands on the occupational choice model of Keane and Wolpin (1997) by adding job
matching between workers and rms, rm specic human capital, heterogeneity in preferences for
employment in each occupation, and by expanding the number of civilian occupations from two to
ve. Incorporating the human capital occupational choice approach to career dynamics along with
the rm based job search approach within a unied model is necessary to determine the relative
importance of each modelling approach in explaining career choices, wages, and total utility.
The parameters of the structural model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using
data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The likelihood
function follows directly from the recursive numerical solution to each individuals dynamic pro-
gramming problem. The computational cost of estimation is substantial because simultaneously
modelling human capital accumulation, job search, and occupational choices creates a dynamic
programming problem that is challenging to solve. Estimation is made feasible by implementing an
interpolation method when solving the dynamic programming problem that modies the approach
2See Blau (1991), Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998), and Dey and Flinn (2005) for examples of search models
that incorporate non-pecuniary job characteristics.
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developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) in a way that takes advantage of the special structure of
this model.
The career choice model nests a human capital model of occupational choices and a job search
model, so the structural parameter estimates provide direct evidence about the relative importance
of rm and occupation specic human capital, job search, and heterogeneity in occupation spe-
cic skills and preferences in determining career choices, wages, and total utility. The parameter
estimates show that features of a dynamic human capital model and job search model are both
necessary to understand the evolution of wages and utility over the career. The potential percent
increase in wages caused by the acquisition of rm specic human capital ranges from 9.5% to 24.8%
across occupations, and the potential wage gains from occupation specic human capital range from
essentially zero to 17% across occupations.3 The estimates of the e¤ects of human capital on wages
indicate that search models that do not incorporate human capital accumulation are missing an
important source of wage growth. The potential wage gains from job search are also quite large. A
worker who is able to move from a 25th percentile rm match to a 75th percentile match realizes
a 45% increase in wages. Occupational choice models set in a human capital framework where all
jobs are identical within occupations are missing a key determinant of wage growth.
The structural model is used to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the importance
of rm and occupation specic capital, education, matching between workers and rms, and match-
ing between workers and occupations in determining total earnings and overall welfare. Previous
research has not been able to determine the relative importance of these factors because existing
models have not incorporated job search, occupational matching, and human capital accumulation
within a unied model. The counterfactual simulations reveal that eliminating the returns to rm
and occupation specic capital reduces total wage earnings by 2.7%. The wage gains resulting from
3Estimating the return to rm tenure has been the subject of a large literature. See, for example, Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and Dustmann and Meghir (2005). Estimating the returns to occupation tenure has
received far less attention. See, for example, Kambourov and Manovskii (2006) for instrumental variables estimates
of the returns to occupation tenure.
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utility maximizing mobility between rms and occupations far exceed the wage gains from human
capital accumulation. The counterfactual simulations demonstrate that eliminating the wage gains
from job search reduces earnings in the simulated economy by 19%, while eliminating the gains
from matching between workers and occupations reduces total earnings by 30%. The total social
value of matching between workers and rms, which includes pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility,
is 33% of total utility. The importance of both job search and occupational choices in determining
total earnings and utility highlights the value of jointly modelling these two key facets of the career
decision process.
The model is also used to determine the importance of permanent heterogeneity in skills and
preferences in determining lifetime utility relative to the importance of randomness in wage and
utility shocks, randomness in human capital improvement, and randomness in the arrival of rm-
specic job matches. The results indicate that 64% of the variation in lifetime utility is determined
by permanent heterogeneity. To provide some context for this result, Keane and Wolpin (1997) nd
that 90% of lifetime utility is determined by permanent heterogeneity in their career choice model
that does not consider the role of matching between workers and rms in determining wages and
utility. Allowing for matching between workers and rms, rm specic human capital, and random
shocks to non-pecuniary utility reduces the relative importance of permanent heterogeneity in
determining lifetime utility, but its impact is still substantial.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data. Section
3 presents the model of career choices, and Section 4 discusses estimation. Section 5 presents the
structural parameter estimates, and Section 6 presents the results of the counterfactual experiments.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
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The parameters of the model are estimated using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). This data set includes detailed information about the educational and
employment experiences of a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women who were
14-21 years old when rst interviewed in 1979. Interviews were conducted annually up until 1994,
and then biennially in the following years. The data provide a rich set of educational information
about each respondent, including dates of school attendance and dates of graduation and GED
receipt. Employment data include the duration of every employment spell over the sample period,
along with the corresponding wages, hours, and occupation for each employment spell. This infor-
mation allows for the identication of transitions between employers and occupations, as well as
the patterns of wage changes over the career.
The NLSY consists of a nationally representative core sample, a military sample, and a supple-
mental sample that over-samples blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites. This
analysis uses only white men from the nationally representative core sample. Individuals who are
older than age sixteen in the rst year of the NLSY are not used. Individuals remain in the data
set up to age thirty or until the observation is truncated at the rst instance of missing information
about yearly labor force status or the occupation of a yearly job. Respondents are dropped from
the sample if they provide insu¢ cient information to construct a history of educational attainment.
Respondents are also dropped from the sample if they ever serve in the military or work as a farmer.
The nal sample consists of 1,023 men who remain in the sample for an average of 10.37 years,
resulting in 10,609 person yearsof data.
The decision period in the model corresponds to a school year, which runs from September to
August.4 The data are aggregated using an approach similar to that of Keane and Wolpin (1997).
Yearly school attendance is assigned using detailed information on monthly school attendance and
grade completion. The methodology used to assign yearly school attendance consists of several
4Yearly data is frequently used when estimating dynamic structural models. See, for example, Keane and Wolpin
(1997) or Belzil and Hansen (2002).
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steps. First, the amount of education accumulated by each sample member over the sample period
is determined using the variable that indicates the highest grade completed as of each interview
year. Then, starting in the rst year, individuals are considered to be attending school if they
report attending school during the year and completing a grade by the next year. If this approach
fails to assign all the accumulated years of education, then the process is repeated using the weaker
requirement that the person reports completing a grade or attending school during a year. Receipt
of a GED is coded using yearly information on whether or not a person ever earned a GED.
Yearly employment status is determined using the weekly labor force record. The yearly em-
ployment activity is the activity (a specic employer or unemployment) in which the most weeks
were spent during the year. The number of weeks spent unemployed and employed full time at
each employer are counted for each decision year. Jobs consisting of less than twenty hours of work
per week are counted as time spent unemployed.5 The work activity in which the most weeks were
spent during the school year is coded as the yearly labor force activity. For example, suppose that
during a year a person works at rm A for 22 weeks, works at rm B for 10 weeks, and spends 20
weeks unemployed. The primary activity for this year is working at rm A, so working at rm A
is coded as the yearly activity. The yearly occupation is the one corresponding to rm A. Given
the assumption that employment is full-time, an individuals wage is converted into a yearly wage
by multiplying the hourly wage by 2,000 hours.
Transitions between rms are identied using the NLSY survey variables that indicate whether
or not a current employer is the same as an employer in the previous year. One unavoidable
consequence of the aggregation of weekly data into yearly data is that yearly data understate the
number of transitions between rms. The identication of transitions between rms is a key feature
of the model presented in this paper, so it is important to consider the e¤ects of aggregation on
the number of transitions between rms present in the data. One way of assessing the e¤ects of
5 Incorporating part time employment as a choice variable in the structural model is conceptually straightforward,
but it would increase the cost of estimation substantially.
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aggregation is to compare the average number of jobs that a person holds over the sample period
using di¤erent levels of aggregation. Using the weekly NLSY employment record, the average
number of jobs is 11. When the data are aggregated to half-yearly, the average number of jobs falls
to 7. Using yearly data, the average number of jobs is 6. The e¤ects of aggregation are fairly large
when moving from weekly to half-yearly data, but relatively small when moving from half-yearly
to yearly data.6
The NLSY data provides information on occupational codes at the three digit level. The level
of detail provided in these codes raises questions about the proper denition of an occupation.
The human capital model presented in this paper suggests that an occupation should be dened
as a set of jobs that have common requirements in terms of skills and abilities. Based on this
denition, occupations should be dened in such a manner that within each group some portion
of an individuals occupation specic abilities and accumulated skills will be transferable across all
jobs that fall into the group. Another important consideration is that the cost of estimating the
model increases substantially as the number of occupations increases, so using extremely detailed
occupational classications is not computationally feasible. Based on these considerations, occu-
pations are aggregated into the ve occupational groups listed in Table 1. Aggregating occupations
into ve groups is a lower level of aggregation than that found in existing research. Recent dynamic
structural models of occupational choices such as Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005) have
aggregated the data into only two occupations (blue and white collar). Lee and Wolpin (2006)
model both sectoral and occupational choices by allowing workers to choose between blue, white,
and pink collar employment in both the service and goods sectors, but they do not model job search
decisions.
6Hall (1982) provides a basis for comparison, reporting that workers, on average, hold 10 jobs over the course of
their careers. Similarly, Topel and Ward (1992) nd that workers hold 7 jobs in the rst 10 years of their careers.
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2.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section highlights the key characteristics of the data and provides descriptive statistics about
the career choices observed in the data. Table 2 shows the choice distribution by age. There are
1,023 people in the sample at age 16. This number declines fairly smoothly over time because some
observations are truncated at each age due to missing data. Approximately 86% of the sample
attends school at age 16. School attendance takes a discrete drop to 48% at age 18, the age where
most people have graduated from high school. As an alternative to high school graduation, 6.6%
of the sample reports earning a GED at some point over the sample period. School attendance
declines steadily throughout the college ages and then drops to approximately 16% at age 22, the
normal college graduation age. School attendance declines to 4.8% by age 25, and continues to
decline at more advanced ages. Keane and Wolpin (2001) report a qualitatively similar relationship
between age and schooling using less highly aggregated data that divides each school year into
three segments. As school attendance declines with age, the percentage of people employed as
professional and managerial workers steadily increases from 1.4% at age 16 to 34.5% at age 30.
In contrast, the percentage of people employed as service workers is relatively stable over time,
ranging between 5 and 8%.
The percentage of people unemployed is 10% at age 16. Unemployment rises to approximately
20% at ages 18-21 before stabilizing at close to 10% at ages 24 and above. The large number of
people classied as unemployed is due to the denition of school attendance used to classify people
as attending school. Recall that a person must attend school and complete a grade to be coded as
attending school, so people who attend school and fail to complete a grade are classied as unem-
ployed. Additionally, a person who is unemployed for 27 weeks during a year and employed for 25
weeks is classied as unemployed, because his primary activity during the year was unemployment.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) report a similarly high rate of unemployment using slightly di¤erent
denitions of employment and school attendance.
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Table 1 
Description of Aggregated Occupations 
Aggregated Occupations 
1970 Census 
Occupation 
Codes 
Example Occupations 
Professional, Technical, 
Managers 001 - 245 
Architects, Economists, Office Managers 
Craftsmen 401 - 580 Carpenters, Electricians, Automobile Mechanics 
Operatives & Non-farm Laborers 601 - 785 Butchers, Truck Drivers, Groundskeepers 
Sales & Clerical 260 - 395 Insurance Agents, Bank Tellers 
Service 901 - 984 Janitors, Dishwashers, Nursing Aides  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Choice Distribution by Age 
Age School 
Professional 
& Managers Craftsmen 
Operatives 
& laborers 
Sales & 
clerical Service Unemployed 
Total 
Observations 
16 85.7 1.4 2.2 10.9 2.9 7.6 10.4 1,023 
17 79.4 2.1 4.0 12.7 7.1 8.5 12.6 963 
18 48.3 2.8 6.8 16.9 8.0 8.5 21.4 893 
19 38.2 5.6 10.1 17.7 8.8 7.4 20.4 838 
20 33.3 8.9 14.3 17.4 7.8 7.4 19.7 798 
21 27.6 11.5 16.8 17.6 9.5 6.9 18.0 756 
22 16.4 17.5 17.5 18.6 13.9 6.2 16.4 714   
23 10.5 22.7 16.6 18.4 14.4 8.4 14.8 675 
24 8.3 26.1 20.1 18.6 12.9 7.6 10.5 641 
25 4.8 29.2 21.4 16.3 12.7 6.8 12.0 607 
26 5.8 32.6 19.7 18.3 11.7 7.1 8.7 589 
27 3.4 32.2 21.0 16.9 13.5 5.0 10.5 562 
28 5.0 35.8 19.4 15.5 11.2 5.4 10.6 536 
29 1.2 33.7 16.7 18.2 10.5 7.2 13.4 516 
30 1.0 34.5 19.5 17.9 11.4 6.6 9.4 498 
All 24.6 19.8 15.1 16.8 10.4 7.1 13.9 10,609 
Note:  Entries are percentages. Rows need not sum to 100% because school attendance and employment are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows that there are di¤erences in the levels of inter-rm and intra-rm occupational
mobility. The relevant entries in each cell for this discussion are the top entries, which are com-
puted using the NLSY data.7 Mobility between occupations is more likely to occur when a person
switches rms than when the person does not switch rms. The age patterns in these two types
of occupational mobility are also quite di¤erent. Inter-rm occupational mobility declines by 29%
from the youngest age group to the oldest, while intra-rm occupational mobility declines by 41%.
The di¤erence in the age patterns between these two types of mobility suggests that opportunities
for intra-rm occupational switches may become less frequent with age.
Table 4 allows for a more detailed examination of mobility between occupations. Cell (i,j )
of this table (where i represents the row and j represents the column) gives the percentage of
employment spells in occupation i that are followed by a spell in occupation j. The relevant entries
for this discussion are the top entries, which are computed using the NLSY data. For example,
cell (2,1) indicates that a person employed as a craftsman has a 7.25% chance of becoming a
professional or managerial worker in the next year, conditional on being employed in the next year.
The diagonal elements of the occupational transition matrix in Table 4 are fairly large, indicating a
substantial amount of persistence in occupational choices. However, even at this relatively high level
of aggregation there is a substantial amount of occupational mobility. The diagonal elements show
that people employed as professional and managerial workers are least likely to switch occupations,
while sales and clerical workers are most likely to switch occupations.
Overall, the transition matrix is fairly symmetric, with the exception of the ows of workers
between the sales and clerical and service occupations to professional and managerial employment.
Workers are much more likely to switch from sales and clerical or service employment to professional
and managerial jobs than in the opposite direction. The largest ow of workers between occupations
occurs from sales and clerical to professional and managerial employment.
7The bottom entries in the cells in Tables 3 and 4 are computed using simulated data generated from the estimated
structural model. These entries will be discussed in detail later in the paper.
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Table 3 
Summary of Occupational Mobility by Age: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data 
(bottom entry) 
Ages Conditional on Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
Conditional on not Switching 
Firms, % Switching 
Occupations 
16-21 57.64% 
54.36% 
29.94% 
27.42% 
22-25 50.09% 
47.21% 
26.85% 
23.51& 
26-30 40.76% 
37.84% 
17.61% 
14.98% 
All Ages 49.78% 
46.51% 
24.69% 
21.82% 
Note: Probabilities are computed using all consecutive years of employment observed in the data for each 
age group. The top entry in each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom entry is computed 
using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Occupational Transition Matrix: NLSY Data (top entry) and Simulated Data (bottom 
entry) 
 Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Total 
Professional 
& Managers 
83.28 
86.21 
4.22 
2.80 
3.00 
2.51 
7.35 
6.48 
2.15 
2.00 100.00 
Craftsmen 7.25 
5.50 
75.59 
77.41 
13.05 
12.17 
2.55 
4.30 
1.57 
.62 100.00 
Operatives & 
Laborers 
4.74 
4.73 
14.90 
13.56 
68.98 
71.10 
7.66 
7.51 
3.71 
3.10 100.00 
Sales & 
Clerical 
20.45 
17.01 
4.60 
5.98 
10.76 
8.84 
61.94 
65.73 
2.25 
2.44 100.00 
Service 10.53 
8.78 
7.22 
7.02 
9.32 
8.10 
4.51 
6.24 
68.42 
69.86 100.00 
Total 32.09 
 29.70 
22.69 
21.35 
22.43 
22.99 
14.08 
 16.12 
8.70 
9.84 100.00 
Note: The entries in this table are transition probabilities from the occupation in the left column to the 
occupation in the top row. The top entry in each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the bottom 
entry is computed using simulated data generated using the estimated structural model. 
 
 
 
3 Economic Model of Career Choices
Each individuals career is modeled as a nite horizon, discrete time dynamic programming problem.
In each year, individuals maximize the discounted sum of expected utility by choosing between
working in one of the ve occupations in the economy, attending school, earning a GED, or being
unemployed. Workers search for suitable wage and non-wage match values across rms while
employed and non-employed given their skills and preferences for employment in each occupation.
Dual activities such as simultaneously working and attending school are also feasible choices.8
The exact set of choices available in year t depends in part on the labor force state occupied in
the previous year. Each period, an individual always receives one job o¤er from a rm in each
occupation and has the option of attending school, earning a GED, or becoming unemployed.
In addition, people who are employed have the option of staying at their current job during the
next year and may also have the option of switching occupations within their current rm. While
employed, a worker receives either zero or one opportunity to switch occupations at his current rm.9
Individuals observe all the components of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards associated with
each feasible choice in each decision period and then select the choice that provides the highest
discounted expected utility.
Human capital enters the model through the endogenous accumulation of both rm and occu-
pation specic work experience and education, which a¤ect wages and non-pecuniary utility ows.
Thus, workers choose to accumulate schooling, which is costly, in order to obtain higher utility in
the future. Jobs are also partly investment goods in the model because forward looking workers
realize that work experience a¤ects the distributions of wage o¤ers and non-pecuniary benets that
they face.
8Light (2001) nds that omitting work experience gained while attending school produces an upward bias of
25%-44% in the estimate of the return to schooling.
9Many models of labor mobility ignore the possibility that workers may switch occupations within a rm. Analysis
of the NLSY data presented in Section 2 suggests that that a signicant fraction of workers switch occupations without
switching rms.
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3.1 Utility Function
The utility function is a choice specic function of endogenous state variables (St), skill endowments
and preferences, and random utility shocks that vary over time, people, occupations, and rm
matches. The variables in St measure educational attainment, rm and occupation specic human
capital, and the quality of the match between a worker and rm. To index choices for the non-work
alternatives, let s = school, g = GED and u = unemployed.10 Describing working alternatives
requires two indexes. Let eq = employed in occupation q, where q = 1; :::; 5 indexes occupations.
Also, let nf =working at a new rm, and of =working at an old rm.Combinations of these
indexes dene all the feasible choices available to an individual. The description of the utility
ows is simplied by dening another index that indicates whether or not a person is employed,
so let emp =employed. Dene the binary variable dt(k) = 1 if choice combination k is chosen at
time t, where k is a vector that contains a feasible combination of the choice indexes. For example,
dt(s) = 1 indicates that schooling is chosen at time t, and dt(s; e3; nf) = 1 indicates attending school
(s) while employed in the third occupation (e3) at a new rm (nf). Dual activities composed of
combinations of any two activities are allowed subject to the logical restrictions outlined in Section
3.1.2.
3.1.1 Choice Specic Utility Flows
This section outlines the utility ows corresponding to each possible choice. The utility ow from
choice combination k is the sum of the logarithm of the wage, wit(k), and non-pecuniary utility,
Hit(k), that person i receives from choice combination k at time t,
Uit(k) = wit(k) +Hit(k): (1)
10There is no uncertainty in the receipt of a GED in the model. If an individual decides to earn a GED, he receives
one. In reality, people must pass a test to earn a GED. Tyler et al (2000) report that roughly 70% of people pass the
GED exam on the rst try. Within two years the eventual pass rate is 85%.
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The remainder of this section describes the structure of the wage and non-pecuniary utility ows
in more detail.
3.1.1a Wages. The log-wage of worker i employed at rm j in occupation q at time t is
wit = wq(Sit) + 
q
i +  ij + eijt: (2)
The term wq(Sit) represents the portion of the log wage that is a deterministic function of the
work experience and education variables in the state vector. The occupation specic subscript q
allows the parameters of the wage equation to vary over occupations. For example, the e¤ect of
education on wages may di¤er by occupation. The term qi represents the random component of
worker is wages that is common across all rms in occupation q. This term allows people to have
comparative advantages in their occupation specic skill endowments.11 The permanent worker-
rm productivity match is represented by  ij . This term reects match specic factors that are
unobserved by the econometrician and a¤ect the wage of worker i at rm j. True randomness in
wages is captured by eijt. All of the components of the wage (wit) are observed by the worker when
a job o¤er is received.12
3.1.1b Non-pecuniary Utility Flows. Non-pecuniary utility ows are composed of a determin-
istic function of the state vector, rm specic match values, person specic preference heterogeneity,
and random utility shocks. Dene 1fg as the indicator function which is equal to one if its argu-
ment is true and equal to zero otherwise. The non-pecuniary utility ow equation is
Hit(k) = [h(k; Sit)] +
h
si1fs 2 kg+ ui 1fu 2 kg+
P5
q=1 
q
i 1feq 2 kg
i
(3)
+"ikt:
11Keane and Wolpin (1997) show that heterogeneity in skill endowments is an important determinant of the choice
between blue and white collar employment.
12See Berkovec and Stern (1991) for another model where the quality of the match is revealed when drawn. In
contrast, Jovanovic (1979) develops a model where agents learn about match quality over time.
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The rst term in brackets represents the inuence of the state vector on non-pecuniary utility ows
and is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph. The second term in brackets captures
the e¤ect of person specic heterogeneity in preferences for attending school (si ), being unemployed
(ui ), and being employed in occupation q (
q
i ). The non-pecuniary occupation match value, 
q
i ,
represents the random component of person is preference for working in occupation q. This term
captures variation in the value that people place on job attributes such as the physical or mental
demands of a job or the risk of injury that is common across jobs in each occupation. Stinebrickner
(2001) shows that preference heterogeneity is an important determinant of occupational choices
at the narrow level of choosing between a teaching or non-teaching job. However, this type of
heterogeneity in preferences has not been extended to broader models of occupational choice. The
term si allows for heterogeneity in the cost of schooling caused by unobserved traits such as ability
or motivation that may alter the utility cost of attending school. The nal term, "ikt, is a shock to
the non-pecuniary utility that person i receives from choice combination k at time t.
The remaining portion of the non-pecuniary utility function contains the non-pecuniary em-
ployment and non-employment utility ows along with the schooling cost function. This utility
ow equation is specied as
h(k; Sit) =
hP5
q=1 q(Sit)1feq 2 kg+ ij1femp 2 kg
i
(4)
+Cs(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp =2 kg+ Csw(Sit)1fs 2 k; emp 2 kg
+b(Sit)1fu 2 kg+ Cg(Sit)1fg 2 kg:
The term in brackets contains the occupation and rm specic non-pecuniary utility ows. The
occupation specic portion of this ow, q(Sit), is a function of the state vector that is allowed to
vary over occupations. This specication allows the e¤ect of state variables such as education on
employment utility to vary by occupation. The rm specic non-pecuniary match value for person
i at rm j is represented by ij . This match value reects the inuence of permanent attributes
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of employment at each rm that a¤ect the employment utility ow and are not observed by the
econometrician. For example, job attributes such as commuting distance, relationships with co-
workers, and availability of fringe benets may all a¤ect the value of a job, and their value may
di¤er across people. Non-wage matching of this type has not been incorporated in previous models
of occupational choice.13 The second line of equation 4 contains the schooling cost function. There
are two schooling cost functions, one for attending school while not employed, Cs(Sit), and one
for attending school while working at the same time, Csw(Sit).14 The two schooling cost functions
allow for the possibility that attending school is more costly while employed. The nal components
of the non-pecuniary utility ow are the deterministic portions of the value of leisure enjoyed while
unemployed, b(Sit), and the cost function for earning a GED, Cg(Sit).
3.1.2 Constraints on the Choice Set
The structural modeling approach requires a detailed specication of the labor market constraints
that determine an individuals choice set in each year. First, consider the case of an individual who
enters time period t having not been employed in the previous year. At the start of the year the
individual receives ve job o¤ers, one from a rm in each of the ve occupations in the economy.
Recall that a job o¤er consists of the wage and non-pecuniary value that the worker places on the
job. The individual also observes all components of the rewards associated with attending school,
earning a GED, being unemployed, and all feasible combinations of these choices.15
13Non-wage job characteristics have been shown to be an important determinant of mobility. Bartel (1982) reports
that non-wage job characteristics are an important determinant of job quitting behavior. Blau (1991) rejects a
reservation wage search model in favor of a reservation utility model where hours of work a¤ect utility.
14The model does not consider the e¤ect of borrowing constraints on educational attainment, since this addition
would render an already complicated model completely intractable. Keane and Wolpin (2001) present evidence that
although borrowing constrains are severe, relaxing these constraints has little impact on educational attainment.
Cameron and Taber (2003) examine this issue using a number of di¤erent empirical approaches and consistently
nd that given the current policy regime, there is no evidence of ine¢ ciencies in the schooling market created by
borrowing constraints.
15 In this model workers always have the option of returning to their current job, although the o¤ered wage will
change because each job receives a new random shock in each year (eijt). Thus, transitions into unemployment
are utility maximizing responses to shocks. This framework is adopted in many papers such as Berkovec and Stern
(1991), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Lee and Wolpin (2005). An alternative framework allows for a job destruction
(layo¤) probability and allows workers to always stay at the existing job at the previous wage. Eckstein and van den
Berg (2006) discuss these two alternative models and conclude that There is no aspect of the data that would force
us to prefer one of the two models . . . conceptually the two models are observationally equivalent using data on
14
Any dual activity is a feasible choice, subject to the following restrictions. Earning a GED
must be part of a joint activity, so the single activity dt(g) = 1 is not a feasible choice. In addition,
earning a GED is dropped from the choice set after high school graduation or GED receipt. Finally,
unemployment and employment are mutually exclusive choices. Given these restrictions, the choice
set for individuals who are not employed when they enter period t is
Dnet = f[dt(s); dt(u); dt(u; g)]; [dt(ei; nf); i = 1; :::; 5]; (5)
[dt(q; ei; nf); q = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5]g:
The rst three terms correspond to the feasible non-employment opportunities, the next ve terms
correspond to employment in each of the ve occupations, and the nal ten terms are the feasible
combinations of employment and education.
Next, consider the feasible choices for a person employed in occupation q: At the start of period
t the individual receives one new job o¤er from a rm in each of the ve occupations and has the
option to attend school, earn a GED, or become unemployed.16 In addition, an employed individual
always has the option of remaining at his current rm and staying in his current occupation (q).
Job o¤ers from new occupations at the current rm are received randomly, where workers receive
either zero or one such o¤er per year. Let j denote the probability that a worker receives an o¤er
to work in occupation j at his current rm, where j 6= q. Let nq be the probability that a worker
employed in occupation q does not receive an o¤er to switch occupations within his current rm.
This structure implies that in each period a worker always has the option of switching occupations
if he switches rms, but mobility between occupations within a rm is restricted by the receipt of
employment, unemployment, and the observed dynamic transitions among these states and the observed accepted
wages."
16One possible althernative specication of the model would be to incorporate job o¤er probabilities from each
occupation so that in any given time period, an individual may not receive job o¤ers from all ve occupations. One
could then attempt to estimate these o¤er arrival rates. However, because only accepted wages and transitions are
observed in the data, this alternative model is completely observationally equivalent to the one presented in this
paper. For example, suppose that in the data we observe that laborers rarely ever become professionals. When we
only observe transitions and accepted wages it is impossible to distinguish a world where laborers infrequently receive
professional job o¤ers from a world where laborers frequently receive very low professional wage o¤ers.
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job o¤ers. This feature of the model is intended to capture the fact that the scope for mobility
between occupations within a rm is likely to be more limited than opportunities for mobility into
new occupations when a person also switches rms.
Within-rm occupation switch o¤er probabilities are identied by functional form assumptions
and the transition rates between occupations observed in the data. The model imposes the re-
striction that the distribution of the random components of job o¤ers is the same for internal and
external job o¤ers. Given this restriction, within-rm occupation switch job o¤er probabilities are
identied by the fact that in the data, within-rm occupational switches are observed less frequently
than transitions between occupations when a person moves to a new rm.17
The choice set for a worker employed in occupation q who receives an o¤er to switch to occu-
pation j at his current rm is
Det (j) = fDnet ; [dt(eq; of); dt(s; eq; of); dt(g; eq; of)]; [dt(ej; of); dt(s; ej; of); dt(g; ej; of)]g: (6)
If an o¤er to switch occupations within the current rm is not received, then the nal three choices
are not available to the agent. Let Det (0) denote this twenty-one element choice set.
3.1.3 State Variables
The endogenous state variables in the vector St measure human capital and the quality of the
match between the worker and his current employer. Educational attainment is summarized by
the number of years of high school and college completed, hst and colt, and a dummy variable
indicating whether or not a GED has been earned, gedt: Possible values of completed years of high
school range from 0 to 4, and the possible values of completed college range from 0 to 5, where ve
years of completed college represents graduate school. Work experience is captured by the amount
of rm specic human capital (fct) and occupation specic human capital (oct) in the occupation
that the person worked in most recently. Let Ot 2 [1; 2; :::; 5] indicate the occupation in which a
17See Canals and Stern (2002) for a discussion of a similar identication issue that arises in a simple search model.
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person was most recently employed. Let Lt be a variable that indicates a persons previous choice,
where Lt = f1; :::; 5g refers to working in occupations one through ve, Lt = 6 indicates attending
school full time, and Lt = 7 indicates unemployment.
Given this notation, the state vector is St = fhst; colt; gedt; fct; oct;Ot; Lt; t;  tg: Including
both rm and occupation specic human capital as state variables causes problems because the
size of the state space quickly becomes intractably large due to the fact that the model incorporates
job search, occupational choices, and educational choices. In order to keep the model tractable,
only human capital in the most recent occupation is included in the state space even though this
requires a strong assumption about the transferability of human capital across occupations and the
depreciation of human capital.18 However, age e¤ects are included in the wage equations to proxy
for general human capital that has value in more than one occupation.
In addition to assuming that only human capital in the most recent occupation a¤ects wages,
a second approach is taken to further reduce the size of the state space. Assume that rm and
occupation specic human capital each take on P values, so that the possible values of human
capital arranged in ascending order are
fct 2 FC = ffc(1);:::; fc(P )g
oct 2 OC = foc(1);:::; oc(P )g:
After each year of work experience, with probability  human capital increases to the next level,
and with probability (1   ) human capital does not increase.19 There are separate skill increase
probabilities for rm and occupation specic capital, and the rates of skill increase are also allowed
18 Ideally, one would allow for cross-occupation experience e¤ects in the wage equation, which would require adding
measures of previous occupation specic human capital to the state space. Unfortunately, allowing for these e¤ects
would render an already extremely computationally demanding estimation problem completely infeasable given cur-
rent computer technology. Due to the size of the state space, along with the large number of parameters in the model,
estimating the model presented in this paper is only possible using interpolation methods and parallel processing
techniques. In addition, it is necessary to have access to a large parallel computing cluster to estimate the model
in any reasonable amount of time. Given these considerable di¢ culties, I leave the inclusion of cross-occupation
experience e¤ects as an extension for future research.
19Brown and Flinn (2004) use a similar method to model the process by which child quality changes over time.
17
to vary across occupations. The skill increase parameters are fkf ; ko ; k = 1; :::; 5g, where the
subscripts f and o refer to rm and occupation specic capital, and k indexes occupations. The
human capital transition probabilities (s) are known by agents in the model. Upon entering a
new occupation, oct is reset to the rst level. Similarly, fct starts at the rst level in the rst year
of employment at a rm. The size of the state space is signicantly reduced when P is a small
number relative to the possible values of years of work experience, but the model still captures the
human capital improvement process. In this work, P = 3. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present evidence
that the discrete approach to modelling human capital provides parameter estimates that t the
observed patterns in wage growth in the NLSY extremely well.20
This method of modelling human capital has the advantage of making it possible to include both
rm and occupation specic human capital in the state space at a fraction of the cost of keeping
track of actual years of experience at a rm or in an occupation, because work experience could
range from zero to fteen years in this model. In models of this type with large state spaces, an
alternative approach would be to place relatively low upper bounds on state variables, or omit some
of them entirely. The approach presented here is appealing from a practical standpoint because it
makes estimation feasible, but it is also consistent with the theory of human capital. The number
of years of completed work experience is generally included as an explanatory variable in wage
regressions only as a proxy for the unobservable level of human capital that actually a¤ects wages.
Viewing increases in human capital as a stochastic event is consistent with this idea, because it
20 In a note about this paper Pavan (2006) comments that this model only allows for restrictive wage growth
patterns." However, in fact this approach to modeling human capital is quite exible relative to approaches commonly
used in the literature, such as a quadratic specication. This approach allows wage growth proles to be concave
or convex, and heterogeneous across occupations. In addition, the model allows for ex post heterogeneity in the
returns to human capital because unlucky" individuals may never transition to a higher level of human capital over
their career, but lucky" individuals may experience rapid wage growth. Random human capital improvements also
impact mobility because unlucky individuals will be more likely to switch jobs that lucky individuals. Pavan (2006)
also allows for ex post heterogeneity by assuming that rm and occupation specic human capital improvements
follow a random walk with drift. However, one key di¤erence between the two approaches is that in Pavans model
at the start of a workers career there is no ex ante heterogeneity in expected wage growth because expected wage
growth is the same across all occupations. In this model there is ex ante heterogeneity because the returns to human
capital are allowed to vary across occupations, and workers have di¤erent probabilities of working in each occupation
because they have heterogeneous abilities and preferences.
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allows for the possibility that years of work experience may vary for people with a given level of
human capital.
3.2 The Optimization Problem
Individuals maximize the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility from age 16 (t = 1)
to a known terminal age, t = T . At the start of his career, the individual knows the human
capital wage function in each occupation, as well as the deterministic components of the utility
function. An individual also knows his endowment of market skills (s) and occupation specic
non-pecuniary match values (s). Future realizations of rm specic match values ( s and s)
and time and choice specic utility shocks ("s and es) are unknown. Although future values are
unknown, individuals know the distributions of these random components. Individuals also know
the current values of all variables in the state vector, St, as well as the probability that human
capital will increase in the next period, conditional on employment (kf ; 
k
o ; k = 1; :::; 5).
The maximization problem can be represented in terms of alternative specic value functions
which give the lifetime discounted expected value of each choice for a given set of state variables, St.
Variation in the structure of the value functions comes from di¤erences in the utility ows across
states, and di¤erences in the choice set across states. Regarding the choice set, there are only
two relevant categories of states: employed (including joint employment activities), and all other
choice combinations. While people are employed, the possibility of mobility between occupations
within their current rm implies that the value function will be structured di¤erently than when
non-employed, because the employed value function must incorporate the value of internal job
o¤ers. The value function and utility ow equations are functions of the state vector, St, but this
argument is suppressed for brevity of notation.
The value function for an individual with discount factor  employed in occupation q is the
utility ow from employment, plus the discounted expected value of the best choice available next
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period,
Vt(eq; l) = Ut(eq; l) + 
X
k 6=q
kEZ
ek
t + [nqEZ
eq
t ]; q = 1; :::; 5; l = of; nf: (7)
The EZekt terms represent the expected value of the best choice in period t+1, conditional on receipt
of an o¤er to work in occupation k at the workers current rm. The expectations are taken over
the random components of the choice specic utility ows, which are the random utility shocks and
match values, f"; e;  ; g. The expectation is also taken over rm and occupation specic human
capital, (fc and oc) since human capital evolves stochastically.21
Consider the rst summation in equation 7. Each term in the sum corresponds to the probability
that a job o¤er to work in a new occupation at the current rm is received (so k 6= q), multiplied
by the corresponding expected value of the best option next period. For each occupation q it must
be the case that
P
j 6=q j + nq = 1: The structure of the value function is similar to the model
presented by Wolpin (1992) in that both models allow the arrival of some types of job o¤ers to be
random, which implies that the values of future choices must be weighted by job o¤er probabilities.
Wolpin (1992) estimates job o¤er probabilities for unemployed and employed job searchers, in
contrast to the intra-rm job o¤er probabilities estimated in the present model.
The individual elements of the EZekt terms are the time t+ 1 value functions for each feasible
choice,
EZekt = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); [Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);
m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5; ]; Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of);
Vt+1(ek; of); Vt+1(s; ek; of); Vt+1(g; ek; of)g : (8)
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these expected values as Emax. The nal term in
the employed value function corresponds to the case where an individual does not receive an o¤er to
21See Rust and Phelan (1997) for an example of another dynamic programming model where agents face uncertainty
about how the state vector will evolve over time.
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switch occupations within his current rm. In this case, switching occupations without switching
rms is not possible, so the expected value of the best choice at time t+ 1 is
EZeqt = EmaxfVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (9)
[Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf);m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5];
Vt+1(eq; of); Vt+1(s; eq; of); Vt+1(g; eq; of)g:
The value function for an individual who is not currently employed is simpler because mobility
within a rm is obviously not possible for people who are not employed. The value function is
Vt(p) = Ut(p) + EZ
su
t ; p = fsg; fug; fu; gg (10)
The corresponding expected value of the maximum term is
EZsut = Emax fVt+1(s); Vt+1(u); Vt+1(u; g); (11)
Vt+1(ei; nf); Vt+1(m; ei; nf); m = s; g; i = 1; :::; 5g ;
which consists of all feasible combinations of schooling, unemployment, and new job o¤ers.
Agents making career decisions use the value functions to determine the optimal educational
and employment choices in each period. Each period, a person observes all of the components of
the utility ows of each feasible choice, and then calculates the value of each choice using equations
7 through 11. He then chooses the option with the highest discounted expected value.22
22A related model is developed by Pavan (2006), who presents a model of search across rms and careers. Pavan
must make a number of assumptions to make his model tractable because he denes careers using very detailed three-
digit occupation and industry codes. Some of the key di¤erences between the two papers are: 1) His model imposes
the restriction that expected wage growth proles are identical across all occupations. In contrast, the results in this
paper suggest that expected wage growth due to human capital accumulation varies widely across occupations, and
that this heterogeneity has important implications for wage growth. 2) Education is exogenous in Pavans model, and
also is restricted to have the same e¤ect on wages across all occupations. These assumptions simplify the model, but
as a result his model is unable to account for the fact that educational and occupational choices are made jointly. 3)
There is no on the job search in Pavans model, while there is on the job search in the model presented in this paper.
In his model workers must choose to leave their jobs before observing a new o¤er, while in contrast this paper allows
workers to observe their current job o¤er and the outside job o¤ers before making a mobility decision. In Pavans
model workers will leave bad matches, but the model is unable to account for wage growth resulting from workers
receiving an extremely good sequence of job matches, because once workers have found a good match they will be
unwilling to leave that match to take a chance on receiving a better o¤er. As a result, his model predicts that 2/3
of all jobs end exogenously. 4) In Pavans model, at the start of the career a worker has the same expected wage
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3.3 Solving the Career Decision Problem
Estimating the structural parameters of the model requires solving the optimization problem faced
by agents in the model. The nite horizon dynamic programming problem is solved by backwards
recursion. Assume that there is some age, T , after which no choices are made, and another age, T 
at which the agent dies. Then, evaluating the value functions from T  to T  is straightforward,
because the value function for each choice is simply a sum of one period expected utility ows.
Given the value functions at age T ; the value functions can be solved backwards recursively for all
t < T  using equations 7 through 11. Before considering the solution of the model in more detail,
it is useful to specify the distributions of the random components of utility ows.
3.3.1 Distributional Assumptions
Assume that rm specic match values and randomness in wages are distributed i.i.d normal:
ij v N(0; 2),  ij v N(0; 2 ), and eijt v N(0; 2e). The rm specic pecuniary and non-
pecuniary match values are part of the state space because the value function associated with a
job depends on the wage match value ( ij) and non-wage match value (ij) for worker i at rm j.
The distributions of these variables are continuous, which causes a problem because the state space
becomes innitely large when continuous variables are included. This problem is solved by using a
discrete approximation to the distributions of wage match values ( ij) and non-wage match values
(ij) when solving the value functions and computing the likelihood function.
Assume that the random choice-specic utility shocks are distributed extreme value, with dis-
in every occupation, because he does not model comparative advantages across occupations. As a result, all sorting
across occupations and mobility between occupations in his model is caused by random wage shocks. Therefore, it
is unlikely that his model is able to match the distribution of workers across occupations, mobility patterns between
occupations, or the wage distribution in each occupation. 5) Pavans model does not allow for non-pecuniary utility
to impact career choices. 6) His model does not incorporate unemployment. Still, Pavans model is richer than mine
in two dimensions. First, he considers the more general topic of career choice, rather than the occupational choices
considered in this paper. He also uses the very detailed three-digit occupation and industry codes to dene careers,
as opposed to ve broad occupational groups. It is likely that using ve broadly dened occupational categories
understates mobility. However, it should be noted that one problem with using three-digit codes is that they are
known to be extremely noisy. For example, a validation study by Mellow and Sider (1983) nds that only 58% of
three-digit occupation codes are correctly recorded, so using three-digit codes will lead to a large number of false
transitions between occupations.
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tribution function F (") = expf  exp(  " )g, and with variance 22=6: The assumption that the "s
are distributed extreme value simplies the computation of the value functions and choice proba-
bilities.
It remains to specify the distributions of the occupation specic skill endowments (s) and
preferences (s). Using an approach similar to Heckman and Singer (1984), Keane and Wolpin
(1997), and Stinebrickner (2001), the joint distribution of skill endowments and preferences is
specied as a discrete multinomial distribution. Let i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g be the vector
of skill endowments and preferences that are known to the agent at age sixteen.
Assume that there are M types of people, each with a di¤erent endowment of skills and pref-
erences, fm;m = 1; :::;Mg. Dene m as the proportion of the mth type in the population.
Endowment heterogeneity is unobserved to the econometrician, but assume that we do know that
there are M types of people. This exible assumption about the joint distribution of skills and
preferences allows for a wide range of patterns of comparative advantages in skills and heterogeneity
in preferences. As the number of types of people,M , becomes large, this approach can approximate
any joint distribution of skills and preferences arbitrarily well.
3.3.2 Calculating the Value Functions
This section discusses the details of the solution to the dynamic programming problem. The
major complication arises from the fact that as the model is specied the Emax integrals do not
have closed form solutions. In many dynamic programming models, researchers assume that the
only randomness in utility ows is choice specic, independent over time, and distributed extreme
value.23 A consequence of this assumption is that the Emax integrals have a simple closed form.
However, the unappealing consequence of this assumption in this application is that it rules out
job matching in wages and non-wage utility ows. Job matching in wages has been shown to be
empirically important in dynamic models such as Miller (1984) and Berkovec and Stern (1991),
23See, for example, Rust (1987) and Rust and Phelan (1997).
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and is the basis of job search models.
To the extent that mobility decisions are based on non-wage factors, the addition of matching
in non-wage utility ows to the career decision problem will contribute to the understanding of the
causes of transitions between rms and occupations. This work allows for job matching e¤ects in
both wage and non-pecuniary utility by using simulation methods to evaluate the high dimensional
integrals required to calculate Emax. Berkovec and Stern (1991) avoid having to use simulation
methods because they assume that people know their future job match values with certainty. Allow-
ing for uncertainty in future realizations of job match values provides a more complete description
of the factors inuencing mobility between rms.
At this point it is useful to partition the vector of error terms, excluding ", into two sets. Let

t = f ; ; eg be the set of errors whose future realizations are unknown to the agent at time t;
and dene the joint density of these errors as f(
t). Recall that the vector of skill endowments and
preferences is i = f1i ; :::; 5i ; 1i ; :::; 5i ; si ; ui g. Consider calculating the expected value of the best
choice available next period for a person who is employed in the current time period. Conditional
on 
t and rm and occupation specic human capital (fct and oct), the expected value of the
maximum has a closed form solution because of the assumption that " is distributed extreme value,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " j 
t;i; oct; fctg = ( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt j 
t;i; oct; fct)

)]) (12)
= 	(dt j
t;i; oct; fct) ;
where V (dt) = V (dt)  ",  is Eulers constant, and  is a parameter of the extreme value distribu-
tion. Let f() represent the density of the variable in parentheses. Integrating over the distributions
of 
t, fct and oct provides the unconditional expected value of the best choice available next period
for each endowment type,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt)+" jig =
Z Z Z
  
Z
	(dt j
t;i; oct; fct)f(
t)d
t

f(fct)dfctf(oct)doct: (13)
This integral does not have an analytical solution, so it is simulated using R draws from the
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joint density f(
t). In this work, R = 40.24 The integral over the distribution of human capital
is simply a probability weighted sum because the distribution of human capital is discrete. Let r
index simulation draws, and the simulated integral is simply the average of equation 13 over the R
draws,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + "j ig = 1
R
RX
r=1
PX
h=1
Pr[fct = fct(h) j fct 1]
PX
z=1
Pr[oct = oct(z) j oct 1]
	(dt j
rt ;i; oczt ; fcht ): (14)
The other Emax terms found in the value function calculations are also approximated using this
method.
The major computational burden of solving the model arises from the fact that the Emax func-
tions must be simulated at each point in the state space over the agents entire time horizon. When
the number of points in the state space is large, as it is in this model, evaluating the value function
becomes very time consuming. Several methods to reduce the computational expense of evaluating
value functions in dynamic programming models have been developed in recent years. For exam-
ple, Rust (1997) proposes a method that uses randomization to break the curse of dimensionality,
Keane and Wolpin (1994) use a linear regression to interpolate value functions, and Brien, Lillard,
and Stern (2006) interpolate value functions using a weighted average of "close" points in the state
space.
This paper employs an interpolation algorithm that follows along the lines of the one developed
by Keane and Wolpin (1994). As in Keane and Wolpin (1994), value functions are simulated at a
fraction of the state space and interpolated using a regression at the remaining points in the state
space. This paper implements a new regression function that takes advantage of the assumption
that the error term " is distributed extreme value. If the only source of randomness in the model
was the error term ", then the expected value of the maximum would have the closed form solution
24Antithetic acceleration is used throughout estimation to reduce variance of the simulated integrals. See Geweke
(1988) for a discussion of antithetic acceleration, and Stern (1997) for a review of the applications of simulation
methods in the economics literature.
25
shown in equation 12. This is not the case in this model due to the existence of the wage match
values ( ), non-wage match values (), and random wage shocks (e), but it suggests the following
functional form for the interpolating regression,
E max
dt2Dt
f V (dt) + " g = !0t + !1t( + ln[
P
dt2Dt
exp(
V (dt )

)]) (15)
= !0t + !1t	(dt) :
The parameters !0t and !1t are estimated by OLS, and allowed to vary over time. This regression
function has the desirable theoretical property that it converges to the exact solution for Emax as
;  ; and e approach 0. In addition, it also satises the theoretical restrictions on the Emax
function outlined in McFadden (1981). Another important property of this regression function is
that the regressor is dened at every point in the state space even if the set of feasible state points
varies over the state space, as it does in this model. In contrast, the regression function proposed
by Keane and Wolpin (1994) uses the value functions corresponding to each element in the choice
set separately as regressors, which creates a missing data problem when the choice set is state
dependant.25
During estimation, the value functions are simulated at approximately 1% of the state space and
interpolated at the remaining points. The regression function ts the data very well. Throughout
estimation, the R2 from the interpolating regression remained between :95 and :99: Experimentation
shows that the actual and interpolated value functions di¤er by approximately 1% on average.
4 Estimation of The Structural Model
The parameters of the model are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML) using the
career history data from the NLSY. This section begins by specifying functional forms for the
utility ow equations. It concludes with a derivation of the likelihood function and a discussion of
25One solution to this problem would be to use a di¤erent interpolating regression for each feasible choice set in
the state space. Depending on the exact details of the model, this approach has two potential drawbacks: 1) small
sample sizes in each individual regression, 2) the need to estimate a large number of interpolating regressions.
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the methods used to maximize the likelihood function.
4.1 Further Model Specication
Before discussing the details of estimating the parameters of the structural model, it remains to
specify the wage equations, non-pecuniary utility ow equations, and job o¤er probabilities in more
detail.
4.1.1 Wage and Utility Flow Equations
This section denes the deterministic portion of the utility function. The deterministic portion of
the occupation specic human capital wage function is
wq(Sit) = 
q
1ageit + 
q
2age
2
it=100 + 
q
3hsit + 
q
4colit + 
q
51[ageit  17]+ (16)
q61[ageit  18 \ ageit  21] + q7gedit
+q81[fcit = fc(1)] + 
q
91[fcit = fc(2)] + 
q
101[fcit = fc(3)]
+q111[ocit = oc(1)] + 
q
121[ocit = oc(2)] + 
q
131[ocit = oc(3)]:
The parameters q8 and 
q
11 are xed at zero since they are not separately identied from the
constant in the wage equation.26
Let NFt be a dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual is in his rst year of
employment at a rm after being employed at a di¤erent rm in the previous period. Let hdt
and cdt represent dummy variables that indicate receipt of a high school or college diploma. The
non-pecuniary utility ow equation for occupation q is
q(Sit) = 
q
1ageit + 
q
2age
2
it=100 + 
q
3(hsit + colit) + 
q
4ocit + 
q
5fcit + 
q
6hdit (17)
+q7cdit + 
q
8gedit + 
q
91[Lit > 5] + 
q
10NFit q = 1; :::; 5:
The inclusion of explanatory variables in the employment non-pecuniary employment ow equa-
tions allows observable variables to have a direct impact on employment utility in addition to any
26The inclusion of direct age e¤ects in the wage equations follows the approach of Keane and Wolpin (1997). They
allow for a linear age e¤ect along with an age17 dummy variable.
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e¤ect that they may have on wages. For example, as people age it may be the case that physi-
cally demanding occupations become less desirable relative to white collar employment.27 The cost
function for attending school is
cS(Sit) = s1ageit + s2age
2
it=100 + s3hdit + s4cdit + s5hsit + s6colit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
cSW (Sit) = sw1ageit + sw2age
2
it=100 + sw3hsit + sw4colit + s71[Lit 6= 6]
+sw6(hsit  4) + sw7(hsit = 4 \ colit  4) + sw8(colit  4): (18)
The data do not contain information about the monetary cost of attending school, so it is not
possible to separately identify the pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of attending school. This
implies that the schooling utility ow represents the non-pecuniary benet of attending school
minus the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. The deterministic portion of the unemployment
utility ow, b(Sit), is set equal to zero because the non-wage utility ow coe¢ cients are only
identied relative to a base choice, as in any discrete choice model.28
The nal utility ow equation represents the utility derived from earning a GED. The deter-
ministic portion of the GED utility ow is
cg(Sit) = g1 + g2ageit. (19)
Within-rm job o¤er probabilities are specied as multinomial logit, so the probability of receiving
a job o¤er from occupation j at the current rm is
j =
exp(j)P5
k=1 exp(k)
: (20)
27See for example, Stinebrickner (2001) for an example of a dynamic discrete choice model that allows for similar
e¤ects of observable variables on non-pecuniary utility from working in a teaching job relative to a non-teaching job.
Identication of these parameters follows from the use of wage data during estimation. For example, suppose that
after controlling for wage di¤erentials across occupations, higher educated people choose a certain occupation more
frequently than one would expected based only on wages. This suggests that education impacts the employment
non-pecuniary utility ows.
28The specication of the schooling utility ow equation is based closely on Keane and Wolpin (1997). One of
Keane and Wolpins (1997) major ndings is that a bare bones" dynamic human capital model that excludes age
e¤ects and re-entry costs from the schooling utility ow equation is unable to match the rapid decine in schooling
with age. Including direct age e¤ects of this sort has become standard in the dynamic human capital literature. In
addition, it seems reasonable to believe that the e¤ort cost of schooling (or non-pecuniary consumption value) varies
with age.
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Finally, the discount factor, , is set equal to :95 rather than estimated because it can be di¢ cult
to estimate the discount factor in dynamic models, even though it is technically identied.29
4.2 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function used to estimate the structural model follows directly from the model
presented in Section 3. The solution to the dynamic programming problem provides the choice
specic value functions which are used in the construction of the likelihood function. The vector of
parameters, denoted by , is made up of the parameters found in the deterministic portions of the
choice-specic utility ows, error standard deviations, job o¤er probabilities, and skill endowment
vectors and type probabilities. Dene Oit as the observed outcome for person i at time t, which
consists of an observed choice and possibly an observed wage. The likelihood contribution for
person i at time t is simply the joint probability of the choice made by the person and the wage, if
one is observed. These probabilities are discussed in more detail below.
Conditional on having an endowment vector of type k, the likelihood contribution for person i
is the product of the probabilities of each outcome observed in the data over the eTi years that the
person remains in the sample,
Li( j i = k) =
Z
  
Z
[
Z Z 0@ eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j; Sit;i = k)
1A (21)
dF (oc)dF (fc)]dF (
):
Note that the path probability for each person is integrated over the distributions of occupation
and rm specic human capital (oc and fc) because these variables are unobserved. The likelihood
contribution is also integrated over the joint distribution of 
, because these match values and
choice specic utility shocks are not observed.
The high dimensional integrals in the likelihood function are simulated using R draws from
29See Berkovec and Stern (1991) for an example of a model where it was not possible to estimate the discount
factor. Rust and Phelan (1997) nd that the likelihood function for their dynamic retirement model is very at as a
function of the discount factor, so they estimate the discount factor using a grid search. Keane and Wolpin (1997)
are able to estimate a yearly discount factor, their estimate is .936.
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the joint distribution of 
 and Q draws from the joint distribution of occupation and rm specic
human capital. The integral over the joint distribution of human capital is simulated using a
modied Geweke, Keane, and Hajivassiliou (GHK) algorithm because the joint distribution of
human capital is intractably complex. The details of this algorithm are provided in Appendix A.
The simulated likelihood contribution is
LRi ( j i = k) =
1
R
RX
r=1
1
Q
QX
q=1
eTiY
t=1
Pr[Orqit j
ri ; ocq; fcq;; Sit;i = k): (22)
The unconditional simulated likelihood contribution is a weighted average of the type-specic like-
lihoods, where the weights are the type probabilities,
LRi ( ) =
MX
m=1
mL
R
i ( j i = m): (23)
The likelihood function for the entire sample is simply the product of the likelihood contributions
for each person,
LR( ) =
NY
i=1
LRi ( ): (24)
The vector of parameters b that maximizes equation number 24 is the simulated maximum likeli-
hood estimate of .
4.2.1 Outcome Probabilities
The most straightforward outcome probability found in the likelihood function is the probability
of observing a person attending school or being unemployed. In order to make things concrete,
consider the likelihood contribution for a person attending school in time t who was not employed
in period t   1. The likelihood contribution is simply the probability that the value of attending
school exceeds the value of any other choice in the persons choice set, Dnet . A consequence of the
assumption that " is distributed extreme value is that conditional on the other error terms (
),
endowment vector (i), and occupation and rm specic human capital (oc and fc), the choice
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probability is of the multinomial logit form,
Pr(dit = s j
; oc; fc;; Sit;i) = exp(Vt(s))P
k2Dnet
exp(Vt(k))
. (25)
The numerator contains the value of attending school in period t, and the denominator contains the
value functions for each of the feasible choices at time t. Computing the unconditional likelihood
contribution requires integrating over the distributions of 
, oc, and fc as discussed previously.
The probabilities for outcomes involving employment are similar to the non-employed outcome
probabilities, except the choice probability is conditioned on the observed wage and multiplied by
the wage density.
The parameters of the structural model are estimated using a derivative based optimization
routine. The covariance matrix of b is estimated using the outer product of the gradientmethod
of Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). Estimation of the model challenges the limits of
currently available computers due to the extremely large state space of the model, but estimation
is made feasible by employing parallel processing techniques.
5 Structural Parameter Estimates
Tables B1-B4 in Appendix B present the structural parameter estimates and the associated standard
errors. This section discusses selected parameter estimates and their implications for the career
decision process.
5.1 Model Fit
Before discussing the parameter estimates it is useful to consider how well the model is able to
match the patterns found in the NLSY career choice and wage data. The structural parameter
estimates are used to simulate a sample of 2; 000 individuals whose career choices and wages are
compared to those observed in the data. The results of this exercise are presented in Figures 1-2
and Tables 3-5. Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of accepted log wages in the
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Table 5 
 Wage Distribution: Actual & Simulated Data 
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Mean wage: NLSY data 9.78 9.58 9.37 9.51 9.25 
Mean wage: simulated data 9.80 9.61 9.38 9.59 9.33 
Wage std dev: NLSY data .535 .453 .453 .507 .473 
Wage std dev: simulated data .504 .458 .431 .483 .463 
Note: Simulated wages computed from a sample of 2,000 people. Yearly wages are in logs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Actual vs. Simulated Mean Log-wages 
8.9
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.9
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
og
-w
ag
e
Actual
Simulated
NLSY and simulated data. The discrepancies between simulated and actual mean log wages range
from :01 to :08 across occupations, and the model matches the standard deviations of wages in
each occupation even more closely. The model ts the observed wage distribution quite well. In
addition, Figure 1 shows that the model is able to match the age prole of wages extremely closely.
The model captures the general upward trend in mean wages and the sharp increase in mean wages
that occurs at college graduation quite precisely.
Tables 3 and 4 show how well the model ts the patterns of occupational mobility found in the
NLSY data. In Tables 3 and 4 the top entry in each cell is computed using the NLSY data, and the
bottom entry is computed using the simulated data. Table 3 shows that the model is able to match
the rates of inter-rm and intra-rm occupational mobility extremely well. The model captures the
fact that inter-rm occupational switching is more common that intra-rm occupational switching,
and the model also matches the sharper downward age trend in intra-rm occupational mobility.
Table 4 shows that the model is also able to closely match the occupational transition matrix found
in the NLSY data, so the model generates patterns in occupational mobility that are quite similar
to those found in the NLSY. The diagonal elements of Table 4 show that overall, the model tends to
slightly overstate persistence in occupational choices, but in general the models t to occupational
mobility is quite good.
Figure 2 depicts the choice proportions disaggregated by age for both the NLSY data and
simulated data. The model ts the choices observed in the data quite well, in most cases closely
tracking both the levels of the choice proportions found in the NLSY data as well as the age trends.
The model closely matches the sharp upward age trend in professional and managerial employment
found in the NLSY data, and the model also matches the more gradual increase in craftsmen
employment with age. The model also captures the relatively at age patterns in the operatives
and service occupations. The model tracks the downward age trend in school attendance extremely
closely. The simulated data reproduces the general qualitative age pattern in unemployment found
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Figure 2: Choice Proportions by Age – Actual vs. Simulated Data 
Proportion Professional & Managers
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
Proportion Craftsmen
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
 
Proportion O peratives & Laborers
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
Proportion Sales & Clerical
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
 
Proportion Service
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
Proportion Attending School
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n Simulated
Actual
     
    
Proportion Unemployed
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Age
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Simulated
Actual
 
 
in the NLSY data, although the model over predicts the unemployment rate in the late teens and
early twenties. The model also overstates employment in the sales and clerical occupation during
the mid twenties. Overall, a comparison of the actual and simulated data shows that a model that
combines features of a job search model and human capital occupational choice model is able to
t the wage distribution extremely well, and is also able to closely match patterns in occupational
and educational choices.
5.2 The Log Wage Equation: Human Capital & Job Search
The estimates of the log wage equation parameters found in Table B1 reveal the importance of
education and occupation and rm specic human capital in determining wages in each occupation.
The e¤ects of high school and college on wages vary widely across the ve occupations, which
suggests that the types of skills produced by high school and college education are valued di¤erently
across occupations. The percent change in wages resulting from completing an additional year of
high school ranges from a low of 1:3% for craftsmen to a high of 5:9% for operatives and laborers.
The monetary return to attending college also varies across occupations. A year of college increases
wages by approximately 9:7% for professional, managerial, and service workers, while a year of
college increases wages by only 3:1% for an operative or laborer. The e¤ects of education on wages
are statistically signicant at the 5% level in all occupations. The relationship between education
and wages is convex in four out of the ve occupations, with only operatives and laborers realizing
a lower wage gain from college education than high school education.
The nding that the wage function is convex in schooling di¤ers from the results of most studies
of the relationship between schooling and wages which typically assume linearity (Card 1999). A
notable exception is Belzil and Hansen (2002) who also nd a convex schooling-wage function based
on their estimates of a dynamic programming model of schooling and employment choices. In the
present model, the average return per year of education from grade ten to sixteen is 7:6% for
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professional and managerial workers, 3:2% for craftsmen, 4:3% for operatives and laborers, 5:4%
for sales and clerical workers, and 6:4% for service workers. These results are consistent with the
relatively low average return to schooling of 7% per year reported by Belzil and Hansen (2002),
given that they do not allow the returns to schooling to vary by occupation.30 The results also
support the ndings of Manski and Pepper (2000), who question the validity of the extremely high
returns to schooling obtained in many studies that use instrumental variables techniques.31
The e¤ect of a GED on wages ranges from :01% to 5:5% across the ve occupations, and the
e¤ect is statistically signicant in every occupation except craftsmen. Note that the monetary
return to earning a GED is less than the monetary return to completing one year of high school
in every occupation. In contrast, Cameron and Heckman (1993) nd that the GED does not have
a positive e¤ect on wages using a regression which assumes that earning a GED is exogenous. At
the other extreme, Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000) use a natural experiment approach based
on variation in the GED passing standard across states to determine that the GED increases wage
by 10  19%.
The estimates of the rm and occupation specic human capital parameters are presented in the
bottom half of Table B1. These parameters measure the change in log wages accruing to workers as
their rm specic capital increases. For example, moving to the second rm specic human capital
level increases a professionals wage by approximately 12%, and moving to the third level results
in an additional increase of 5:9%.32 The relationship between rm specic capital and wages is
concave for professionals, sales, and service workers, and convex for craftsmen (level 2: 4:4%, level
30The model estimated by Belzil and Hansen (B&H) shares the basic methodology used in this study, as both
studies estimate a dynamic programming model of education and earnings, but there are many di¤erences between
the models. A few of the larger di¤erences are: 1)B&H focus on education so they do not model occupational choices,
2) school interuption is exogenous in B&H, while it is endogenous in the present model, 3) B&H abstract away from
rm and occupation specic capital and job matching since their focus is on education, 4) B&H use a more exible
spline function specication of the returns to education.
31Manski and Pepper (2000) use a monotone IV assumption to determine that the upper bound on the increase
in log-wages from completing four years of college is .397. In this paper, the estimated returns to completing college
range from .388 for professionals and managers to .124 for operatives and laborers.
32The rst human capital level is set equal to zero since it is not separately identifed from the constant in the wage
equation.
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3: 11:2%). The importance of rm specic capital varies across occupations, with operatives and
laborers realizing the lowest wage increases with rm tenure (9:5% at level 3), and service workers
realizing the largest gains (24:8% at level 3). Across all occupations the probability of rm specic
skill increase is essentially equal to one, so wages increase quickly with rm tenure for two years
before levelling out.33
The importance of occupation specic capital varies widely across occupations. Both operatives
and laborers and sales and clerical workers realize essentially no gain from occupation specic
capital, and service workers realize a relatively modest gain of 3:9% when their occupation specic
skills reach the highest level. In contrast, professional and managerial workers realize a wage gain
of 17% at the third level occupation specic capital, while craftsmen experience a wage gain of 13%
at the third level. The relationship between wages and occupation specic capital is convex for
professionals and managers, since moving to the second occupation specic capital level increases
wages by only 2%, while moving to the third level increases wages by an additional 15%. In contrast,
craftsmen realize a large wage gain of 9:6% when moving to the second occupation specic capital
level, but moving to the next level increases wages by only an additional 3:6%. In addition, the
probability of occupation specic skill increase is substantially lower for craftsmen compared to
professionals (:46 vs. :77).
One important consideration is the extent to which the discrete levels of rm and occupation
specic human capital are able to capture the patterns in wage growth found in the NLSY. Most
of the skill increase probabilities are very close to one, with the exception of the rates of increase
for professional and craftsmen occupation specic human capital. When skill increase probabilities
are close to one, wages will increase early in jobs but the highest level of human capital will be
reached quickly. The concern is that the discrete levels approach will understate on-the-job wage
33Rapid wage growth with rm tenure early in jobs that subsides at higher levels of tenure has been found in
several studies. For example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) nd that the rst year of tenure increases wages by 11%.
Dustman and Meghir (2005) report returns to rm tenure for unskilled German workers of 4% per year during the
rst 5 years of tenure, but the returns are zero for higher levels of tenure.
35
growth. Appendix C compares OLS estimates of a quadratic specication of a simple wage equation
to one that uses three discrete levels of human capital. This Appendix shows that the t of the
quadratic and discrete levels wage equations are virtually identical, with R2(quadratic) = :3063
and R2(levels) = :3007: A more detailed discussion is presented in Appendix C, but it appears
that modelling human capital using a discrete number of human capital levels performs extremely
well relative to the commonly estimated quadratic functional form, and does not lead to a serious
underestimate of the importance of rm and occupation specic human capital.
The estimates of the standard deviations of the random wage shock (e) and pecuniary
job match value ( ) show that both job matching and random wage shocks play an important
role in determining wages, and suggest that mobility between rms provides the opportunity for
substantial wage increases. Table 6 quanties the monetary gains to job search (moving to a higher
 ij) relative to the gains from rm and occupation specic human capital accumulation. The rst
row of Table 6 shows the percent increase in wages in each occupation accruing to a worker who
reaches the highest levels of both rm and occupation specic human capital, while the bottom
row depicts the wage gains from moving to higher percentiles of the job match distribution. The
potential wage increase from the combination of rm and occupation specic capital varies widely
across occupations, ranging from a low of 10% for operatives and laborers to a high of 42% for
professionals and managers. There are also substantial gains to job search: a worker who is able
to move from the 25th to 75th percentile of the match value distribution realizes a wage gain from
job search of 45% (exp(:186   [ :186])   1 = :45), while a worker moving from the 5th to 95th
percentile experiences a wage increase of 147%. These results indicate that both human capital
accumulation and job search play important roles in determining wage growth over the career, but
the relative importance of each e¤ect varies by occupation. The primary source of wage growth for
operatives and laborers and sales and clerical workers is nding a good rm match, while in the
other occupations the wage gains from human capital accumulation are quite large relative to the
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Table 6 
 Combined Returns to Firm & Occupation-Specific Capital vs. Gains from Job Search 
 Professional & 
Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Potential cumulative 
wage increase from firm 
& occupation-specific 
capital 
42% 27% 10% 13% 29% 
Potential wage gains 
from job search 
     
25th percentile match to 
75th 45% 
    
5th percentile match to 
95th 147% 
    
Notes: Gains to firm and occupation-specific human capital are computed using the human capital level 
parameter estimates (potential wage increase = exp(firm HC level 3+ occ. HC level 3)-1). 
Gains to job search are based on the percentiles of the pecuniary job match value (ψ) distribution. 
 
Table 7 
Simulated Choice Frequencies by Endowment Type 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Choice percentages at 
age 21 
    
Attending school 4.48% 72.99% 7.47% 15.84% 
Unemployed 13.22% 10.02% 13.07% 72.98% 
Professional & 
managerial 
5.54% 11.09% 8.76% .93% 
Craftsmen 24.31% 2.86% 18.25% 2.48% 
Operatives & laborers 29.85% 5.55% 29.17% 3.11% 
Sales & Clerical 12.58% 18.25% 13.07% 4.04% 
Service 12.15% 11.99% 15.23% 2.17% 
Choice percentages at 
age 27 
    
Attending school .64% 14.49% .43% .93% 
Unemployed 2.56% 2.68% 3.02% 64.91% 
Professional & 
managerial 
28.78% 56.17% 30.75% 5.90% 
Craftsmen 36.25% 1.07% 28.59% 4.97% 
Operatives & laborers 20.04% 3.22% 27.01% 8.07% 
Sales & clerical 7.25% 27.37% 4.60% 9.32% 
Service 5.12% 8.05% 6.03% 6.21% 
Value functions & 
wages at age 27 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Value function of 
optimal choice at age 27 
41.86 7.82 67.89 8.91 43.01 8.12 13.01 5.38 
Wage at age 27 9.92 .42 9.89 .39 9.42 .40 9.44 .42 
Notes: Based on a simulation of 2,000 people. Average simulated wages are conditional on employment. 
Value functions represent the discounted expected value of lifetime utility. 
potential gains from job search.
5.3 Career Choices & Heterogeneity in Skills and Preferences
Table B2 which is located in Appendix B presents the estimates of the log-wage equation intercepts
(s) and non-pecuniary utility ow intercepts (s) for each of the four types of people in the
model, along with the estimated proportion of each type in the population. These parameters
are all statistically di¤erent from zero at the 5% level.34 The log wage intercepts represent skill
endowments in each of the ve occupations, and the non-wage intercepts reect preferences for
employment in each occupation and for attending school. The estimates of the wage intercepts
show that there is substantial variation in market ability both across and within types. Type
1s have the highest ability in each occupation, while type 2s have the second highest ability in
all occupations except service. Di¤erences in the log wage intercepts correspond approximately
to percentage changes in wages, so a persons endowment type greatly inuences their expected
earnings in each occupation. For example, holding the e¤ects of all state variables constant, a
type 1 persons expected wage in the sales and clerical occupation is approximately 37% higher
than a type 2s expected wage, 44% higher than a type 3s expected wage, and 56% higher than
a type 4s expected wage. The across type standard deviations of the s show that professional
and managerial ability varies the most across people, while the service occupation has the least
dispersion in ability.
The non-pecuniary intercepts (s) reect a persons preferences for working in each occupation
and attending school. These parameters are measured in log yearly wage units relative to the base
choice of unemployment. The non-wage employment intercepts are negative across all occupations
and types, which indicates that people experience disutility from employment relative to leisure.
The non-wage employment intercepts vary widely across occupations, which indicates that there is
34 It is common for t-statistics in nonlinear structural models to be very large. See, for example Rust (1987),
Berkovec and Stern (1991), or Keane and Wolpin (1997).
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substantial heterogeneity in preferences for employment in di¤erent occupations across people.
The preference for attending school (or school ability) represents the consumption value of
school net of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of attending school. The value of attending
school varies substantially across types, from a low of 6:074 log yearly wage units for type 1s,
to a high of 16:778 for type 2s. The disaggregation of ability into market skills (s) and school
ability or preference (s) shows that the two dimensions of ability are far from perfectly positively
correlated. Type 1s have the highest market ability in each occupation but the lowest schooling
ability.
Table 7 quanties the impact of heterogeneity in skills and preferences on career outcomes by
summarizing career choices for each endowment type based on simulated data generated from the
structural model. At age 21 there are already substantial di¤erences in career outcomes across
types. Almost 73% of the highest schooling ability people, type 2s, are attending school at age
21. In contrast, the majority of type 1 and 2s have nished attending school and are working
in blue collar occupations as craftsmen or operatives and laborers. Type 4s, who experience the
highest disutility from working and also have the lowest endowment of market ability have a 73%
unemployment rate at age 21. At age 27 types have specialized in di¤erent types of employment
as a result of variation in skills and preferences. Type 2s are essentially white collar workers,
since 56% are employed as professionals and managers, and 27% are employed as sales and clerical
workers. Simulated choices at age 27 for types 1 and 3 are quite similar: 29% vs. 31% professional,
36% vs. 29% craftsmen, and 20% vs. 27% laborers.
It is clear that occupational and educational choices are strongly impacted by heterogeneity in
skills and preferences, but it is not obvious how this heterogeneity a¤ects key career outcomes such
as wages, and, more importantly, total utility. The nal section of Table 7 addresses these questions
by showing the mean simulated value functions along with mean accepted wages for each type at
age 27. Di¤erences in the simulated value functions across types show how the discounted expected
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value of lifetime utility is impacted by heterogeneity in ability and preferences. The discounted
expected value of lifetime utility at age 27 for a type 2 worker is approximately 1.5 times higher
than a type 1 or type 3 worker. The discounted expected value of lifetime utility at age 27 for a
type 2 worker is 5 times higher than a type 4 worker. Type 4 workers on average spend a large
portion of their careers unemployed due to both low market skills and high employment disutility.
Di¤erences in skill endowments and preferences have a substantial impact on welfare at age 27.
Interestingly, type 3s are better o¤ on average than type 1s (43:01 vs. 41:86), even though type
1s have higher market ability in each occupation and receive a lower disutility from working in the
three occupations most often chosen by type 1s and type 3s at age 27.
It is somewhat surprising that type 2s have the highest average discounted expected utility ow
at age 27 even though their expected wages based on market ability are over 30% lower than a type
1 person. The simulated data shows that the large gap in market ability between type 1s and type
2s does not translate into inequality wages at age 27, since average log wages for these types are
virtually identical at 9:92 for type 1s compared to 9:89 for type 2s. Gaps in market ability (s)
do not necessarily translate into wage inequality because pursuit of comparative advantage drives
the observed wage gap below the gap in ability. Most importantly, type 2s have a large advantage
in schooling ability, and as a result they complete more years of schooling than type 1s, as shown
in the large gap in school attendance at age 21 between these two types. Most type 2s work as
professionals and managers where completing college raises wages by 39% over what a high school
educated worker would earn. The combined e¤ect of di¤erences in schooling ability, di¤erences in
employment preferences, and pursuit of comparative advantage result in a wage gap well below the
market ability gap between type 1s and 2s.
The variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across types suggests that skill and prefer-
ence heterogeneity is an important determinant of welfare inequality. A regression of the discounted
expected value of lifetime utility on type dummy variables explains 64% of the variation in lifetime
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utility across people, so heterogeneity in skills and preferences is a key determinant of welfare. One
implication of this result is that job search models that do not incorporate occupations are missing
a key determinant of welfare. The remaining 36% of variation in utility is caused by random shocks
to wages and non-pecuniary utility ows, the arrival of job matches, and randomness in human cap-
ital improvement. To put this result in context, Keane and Wolpin (1997) nd that heterogeneity
in schooling ability and market ability explains 90% of the variation in lifetime utility. The addition
of job search, rm specic capital, and random shocks to non-pecuniary utility to an occupational
choice model reduces the importance of permanent heterogeneity in determining welfare, but its
impact is still substantial.35
Another way of assessing the relative importance of permanent heterogeneity, match values, and
random shocks in determining career choices is to compute the fraction of the unexplained variation
in wages and non-pecuniary utility ows attributed to each of the error terms in the model. The
results of this decomposition are presented in Table 8. The top half of Table 8 shows the percentage
of the unexplained variation in wages in each occupation due to permanent heterogeneity in skills,
q; job matching,  ij ; and random wage shocks, eijt. The total unexplained variation in wages is
simply the sum of the three error components in the model, qi +  ij + eijt.
The results of this decomposition indicate that occupation specic skill endowments and job
matching are both important determinants of wages. For example, the rst row of Table 8 shows
that 31% of the unexplained variation in wages in the professional and managerial occupation is
due to variation in skill endowments (q) across people, and 31% is due to job matching ( ij).
The fraction of the unexplained variation in wages attributed to job matching is fairly stable across
the ve occupations, ranging from 31% to 40%. These results indicate that job matching is a
signicant determinant of wages in all ve occupations. In contrast, the importance of occupation
35 In addition to the previously stated di¤erences between Keane and Wolpin (1997) and the present model, other
key di¤erences that may impact the importance of permanent heterogeneity are the level of aggregation of civilian
occupations (ve compared to two in K+W), the exclusion of military employment from the present model, and the
inclusion of heterogeneity in employment preferences along with heterogeneity in ability in the present model.
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Table 8 
Decomposition of the Variance in Wages & Non-pecuniary Utility Flows 
Log-wage 
Equation
% of Variance Due to 
Permanent Heterogeneity 
in Skills (μ) 
% of Variance Due to 
Wage Match Value (ψ) 
% of Variance Due to 
Random Wage Shock (e) 
Professional & 
Managerial  31% 31% 38% 
Craftsmen  15% 38% 47% 
Operatives & 
Laborers 15% 38% 47% 
Sales & Clerical  19% 36% 45% 
Service  10% 40% 50% 
Non-pecuniary 
Utility
% of Variance Due to 
Permanent Heterogeneity 
in Preferences (φ) 
% of Variance Due to 
Non-pecuniary Match 
Value (ξ) 
% of Variance Due to 
Random Utility Shock (ε) 
Professional & 
Managerial  48% 0% 52% 
Craftsmen  28% 0% 72% 
Operatives & 
Laborers 21% 0% 79% 
Sales & Clerical  23% 0% 77% 
Service  26% 0% 74% 
School 53% 0% 47% 
 
 
Table 9: The Impact of Human Capital, Job Matching, and Occupational Matching on 
Welfare and Wages 
Counterfactuals Total Log-Wages Total Utility 
 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Total % Change from 
baseline 
Baseline (estimated model) 192,599 0% 143,545 0% 
1) Eliminate effect of firm and 
occupation specific capital on 
wages 
187,452 -2.7% 139,871 -2.5% 
2) Eliminate effect of education on 
wages 184,625 -4.1% 132,380 -7.8% 
3) Workers randomly assigned to 
firms, never allowed to switch 
firms 
155,956 -19% 96,862 -33% 
4) Workers randomly assigned to 
occupations, never allowed to 
switch occupations 
135,437 -30% 122,526 -15% 
Notes: Computed using samples of 2,000 simulated people. Total wages and utility are the sums of accepted wages 
and realized one period utility flows over people and years. See Section 6.1 of the text for a description of the 
restrictions imposed under each counterfactual. 
specic skills varies more widely across occupations. The fraction of unexplained variation in wages
attributed to skill heterogeneity ranges from a high of 31% for professionals and managers to a low
of 10% for service workers.
The bottom half of Table 8 decomposes the variance of the error term in the non-pecuniary
utility ow equation (qi +ij+"ijt) into the fraction due to permanent heterogeneity in preferences,
ij , non-pecuniary job matching, ij , and random utility shocks, "ijt. The results of this decompo-
sition indicate that permanent heterogeneity in preferences is an even more important determinant
of variation in utility ows than permanent heterogeneity in skills. Variation in preferences across
people is most important in determining utility for professional and managerial workers, and is least
important for operatives and laborers. The rm specic non-pecuniary match value () accounts
for approximately zero percent of the variation in non-pecuniary utility ows across all ve occupa-
tions. This result indicates that the permanent rm specic non-pecuniary match value is not an
important determinant of employment utility. However, it does not imply that non-wage considera-
tions are of minor importance when workers are searching for jobs since the random non-pecuniary
utility shock (") is an important determinant of utility across all ve occupations. The extremely
small estimate of the standard deviation of the non-pecuniary match value () only implies that
randomness in non-wage utility is not correlated over time within a rm after accounting for corre-
lation at the level of occupations, which is captured by . There are several possible interpretations
of this result. It is possible that non-pecuniary job characteristics vary substantially from one year
to the next for a given rm. Alternatively, even if non-pecuniary conditions are constant over time
within a rm, a worker may evaluate these working conditions and fringe benets di¤erently from
one year to the next.
5.4 Non-pecuniary Utility Flows
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The coe¢ cients of the deterministic portions of the non-pecuniary utility ow equations are pre-
sented in Tables B3 and B4. The coe¢ cients are interpreted as changes in utility ows relative to
the base choice of unemployment. For example, each year of high school completed increases the
one-period utility ow from attending school by :569 relative to the value of being unemployed.
The estimates of the switching costs show that workers incur a mobility cost of approximately 2:66
when switching rms or re-entering employment from unemployment. Incurring the moving cost
has the same e¤ect on utility as a 93% decrease in wages, so these switching costs are quite large.36
The parameter estimates in Table B4 show that the e¤ects of observable variables on employ-
ment non-pecuniary utility vary widely across occupations. For example, each additional year of
education increases employment utility by :773 for professional and managerial workers, but each
year of education decreases employment utility by :649 for craftsmen. Employment utility increases
sharply in each occupation as workers accumulate both rm and occupation specic capital. One
interpretation of these e¤ects is that acquiring greater skills makes a job easier, which reduces the
disutility of working. The positive e¤ect of rm tenure on non-pecuniary utility may also arise from
fringe benets that increase with rm tenure.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
One of the major advantages of structural estimation relative to reduced form approaches is that
structural models can be used to conduct counterfactual experiments to examine the impact of
changes in the economic environment on behavior and welfare. This section uses the structural
model to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the e¤ects of changes in the economic
environment on lifetime earnings and utility. The rst set of counterfactual experiments examines
the contributions of human capital, job matching, and occupational matching to the welfare and
wages of workers. The second counterfactual quanties the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of
36See Berkovec and Stern (1991) or Lee and Wolpin (2005) for examples of other dynamic structural models with
large estimated switching costs.
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job displacement.
6.1 The Social Value of Human Capital, JobMatching, and Occupational Match-
ing
The rst row of Table 9 shows the total log-wages earned and utility realized by workers in 2,000 sim-
ulated careers generated from the structural model. This baseline simulation is based on the model
as specied in Section 3 along with the simulated maximum likelihood parameter estimates. Com-
paring the baseline simulation to simulations that implement counterfactual changes in the model
provides information about the e¤ects of human capital, job search, and occupational matching on
total earnings (log-wages) and welfare (total utility). The rst counterfactual examines the impact
of rm and occupation specic human capital on wages and utility by eliminating the wage e¤ects
of these types of human capital, calculating the value functions under this restriction, and then
using the new value functions to simulate career choices. The e¤ects of rm and occupation specic
human capital on wages are eliminated by setting the following wage equation parameters equal
to zero: qj = 0; q = 1; :::; 5; j = 8; :::; 13. Eliminating the e¤ects of rm and occupation specic
capital on wages decreases total earnings by 2.7%, while the total utility realized by workers in
the simulated economy decreases by 2.5%. In other words, the total pecuniary value of rm and
occupation specic capital is 2.7% of earnings, while the social value is 2.5% of total utility. The
counterfactuals measure the net e¤ect of each change, which includes many o¤setting behavioral
e¤ects. For example, one e¤ect of eliminating the returns to rm and occupation specic capital is
to decrease wages because this change eliminates on the job wage growth. This e¤ect is o¤set to
some degree by the fact that eliminating on the job wage growth reduces moving costs in the form
of human capital that is lost when workers switch rms or occupations.
The second counterfactual quanties the impact of education on wages by showing how wages
and total welfare would change if the pecuniary returns to education were eliminated. This restric-
tion is imposed by setting the e¤ects of high school and college education on wages equal to zero
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across all occupations (q3 = 0; 
q
4 = 0; q = 1; :::; 5). The results of this counterfactual, shown in
Table 9, reveal that the combined pecuniary value of high school and college education is 4.1% of
total earnings, while the total social value is 7.8% of total utility. This counterfactual simulation
captures the net e¤ect of eliminating the returns to education, where the wage losses from the
reduction in human capital are o¤set to some extent because a decrease in the payo¤ to attending
school increases the number of years worked by the average person in the simulated sample. The
social value of education is larger than the pecuniary value because when the pecuniary return to
education is eliminated people choose to accumulate less schooling, which decreases non-pecuniary
utility because there is a consumption value to attending school and because education increases
the employment non-pecuniary utility ow in many occupations.
The third and fourth counterfactuals shown in Table 9 examine the pecuniary and social gains to
matching between workers and rms and workers and occupations. The benets to society resulting
from job search are quantied in the third counterfactual, where workers are randomly matched to
rms and not allowed to switch rms during their career. In this world, the gains to job search are
eliminated because workers are unable to search for jobs across rms. However, workers are free
to self select into their optimal occupation. This counterfactual shows that eliminating job search
reduces total earnings by 19%. The social value of job search is even larger than the monetary
gains: eliminating job search decreases total welfare by 33%. Note that the value of job search to
society dwarfs the social value of human capital. The combined total social value of education and
rm and occupation specic capital is approximately one-third as large as the value of job search
(10% of total utility vs. 33%).
The social value of workers self selecting into occupations (and switching occupations) is cap-
tured in the fourth counterfactual, where each worker is randomly matched to an occupation for
his entire career. This counterfactual eliminates occupational mobility as well as self selection in
occupational choices based on abilities and preferences, but workers are free to move between rms
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over the course of their career. Randomly assigning workers to occupations reduces total earnings
by 30%, so there are substantial monetary gains to society from allowing workers to match them-
selves to occupations based on their skills and preferences. The total welfare gain to society from
matching between workers and occupations is equal to 15% of total utility.
The counterfactual experiments presented in this section highlight the social gains arising from
the mobility of workers across rms and occupations as they make optimal career decisions. Al-
though the parameters indicate that there are substantial pecuniary returns to occupation and
rm specic human capital, the counterfactual simulations show that job search and self selection
into occupations are far more important determinants of wages and total welfare. The large gains
arising from mobility between rms and occupations suggest that it is crucial to incorporate both
job search and occupational choices when studying labor market dynamics since they are both key
determinants of total earnings and overall welfare.
6.2 The Welfare Impact of Job Displacement
The structural parameter estimates highlight the importance of human capital, gains from job
search, and non-pecuniary utility in determining career outcomes and welfare. Given the impor-
tance of these e¤ects, job displacement may result in large pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs by
destroying both human capital and productive job matches. The structural model separately iden-
ties the e¤ects of wages and non-pecuniary utility in determining total utility, so the model is
well suited to quantify both the wage losses caused by displacement as well as the overall impact
on welfare. Previous research on the cost of displacement has focused on the monetary cost of job
loss, which ignores the potentially large role of non-pecuniary utility in determining welfare.
Table 10 shows the impact of job displacement at age 25 on wages and discounted expected
utility ows for workers in each occupation. The table shows that a job displacement at age 25
decreases the discounted expected value of lifetime utility by 17%  27% depending on a workers
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occupation at the time of displacement, with craftsmen experiencing the largest losses, and service
workers experiencing the smallest losses. In the year following a displacement average log wages
for workers who have found a new job are between :08 and :15 lower than their expected wages
in a world where the job loss had not occurred. The negative impact of displacement on wages
dissipates over time as workers accumulate human capital and nd new job matches. Five years
after displacement (age 30), the wages of displaced workers in each occupation are approximately
equal to the wages of non-displaced workers.37 Although the wage e¤ect has subsided after ve
years, the e¤ect on total utility has not, since the average discounted expected value of lifetime
utility for a displaced worker at age 30 is still 1%  6:3% lower than a non-displaced worker.
7 Conclusion
This paper formulates and structurally estimates a dynamic model of educational attainment,
occupational choices, and job search that incorporates self-selection in occupational and educational
choices, endogenous accumulation of rm and occupation specic human capital, and job search
based on rm level wage and non-pecuniary matching. The model integrates the dynamic human
capital occupational choice framework developed by Keane and Wolpin (1997) with the job search
approach to labor market dynamics. The benet of estimating a model that nests both of these
approaches to analyzing career choices is that the parameter estimates provide direct evidence
about the relative importance of features of human capital models relative to features of job search
models in explaining the determination of wages and total utility over the career.
The parameter estimates show that wages increase with both rm and occupation specic
capital, and that the human capital wage function varies widely across occupations. The potential
total wage gains from rm and occupation specic capital range from a low of 10% for operatives
and laborers to a high of 42% for professionals and managers. While the wage gains from human
37Existing evidence on the long term impact of job displacement is mixed. Jacoson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)
nd that in their non-mass layo¤ sample wages recover 5 years after displacement, but Ruhm (1991) nds evidence
of persistent earnings reductions.
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capital are substantial, the estimates of the job search portion of the model indicate that mobility
to better job matches is also a key source of wage growth. In addition, heterogeneity in occupation
specic ability, school ability, and preferences for employment in di¤erent occupations is a powerful
determinant of career choices and overall welfare. This heterogeneity accounts for approximately
64% of the variation in discounted expected lifetime utility across people.
The structural model is used to conduct counterfactual simulations that quantify the contribu-
tions of human capital accumulation, job search, and occupational matching to total income and
overall welfare. These simulations reveal that eliminating the pecuniary returns to rm and occupa-
tion specic human capital would reduce total welfare by 2.5%, eliminating occupational matching
would reduce welfare by 15%, and eliminating the gains to rm matching would reduce welfare by
33%. These results indicate that the importance of labor mobility in determining overall welfare
far exceeds the importance of human capital. Workers realize large gains as they make optimal
occupational choices and inter-rm mobility decisions, which implies that policies that promote
worker mobility by lowering mobility costs or search frictions have the potential to increase wages
and welfare by promoting the e¢ cient assignment of workers to rms and occupations.
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Appendix A: Simulation of the Likelihood Function
With the exception of the integral over the distributions of rm and occupation specic human
capital, all integrals are simulated using simple frequency simulators. This type of simulator is not
practical in the case of the integral over fc and oc because the distributions of these unobserved state
variables are intractably complex. The integral that needs to be evaluated is the path probability
over the sample period, denoted  . The equation for this probability is
  =
Z Z eTiY
t=1
Pr[Oit j; Sit;i = k; oc; fc]dF (oc)dF (fc):
Note that the integral is over the joint distribution of fc and oc over the entire eTi years that person
i remains in the sample. Human capital evolves randomly conditional on career choices, so there
are an enormous number of possible sequences of human capital that could occur. Calculating
this distribution for each sample person is not practical. The solution is to use a modied GHK
algorithm to simulate the integral. The intuition behind this method is the same as in Brien,
Lillard, and Stern (2006). The complete algorithm is outlined below.
1. Draw ocrt j ocrt 1 and fcrt j fcrt 1:
2. Compute Pr[Oit j ocrt ; fcrt ]:
3. Compute  r =  r  Pr[Oit j ocrt ; fcrt ]:
4. If t = eTi, go to step 5. Otherwise, set t = t+ 1 and go to step 1.
5. Repeat these steps for each of the R simulation draws. The simulated path probability is
  = 1R
PR
r=1  
r.
This algorithm simplies the problem because drawing fc and oc conditional on the previous
draw is very straightforward, while drawing from the complete distribution would be very
di¢ cult.
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Appendix B: Structural Parameter Estimates 
 
Table B1 
 Structural Model Estimates 
 
                          Occupations 
Variable Professional 
& managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
laborers 
Sales & 
clerical 
Service 
Log Wage Equation:      
Age (β1) -.018 
(.0007) 
.096 
(.0092) 
.003 
(.0008) 
.036 
(.0018) 
-.011 
(.0012) 
Age2/100 (β2) .089 
(.0031) 
-.408 
(.0153) 
.036 
(.0032) 
-.036 
(.0044) 
.205 
(.0058) 
Years of high school (β3) .048 
(.0061) 
.013 
(.0007) 
.059 
(.0063) 
.029 
(.0008) 
.020 
(.0008) 
Years of college (β4) .097 
(.0032) 
.046 
(.0044) 
.031 
(.0041) 
.073 
(.0019) 
.097 
(.0024) 
Age ≤ 17 (β5) -.272 
(.0033) 
-.069 
(.0039) 
-.201 
(.0130) 
-.180 
(.0133) 
-.032 
(.0047) 
18 ≤ Age ≤ 21 (β6) -.272 
(.0014) 
-.036 
(.0020) 
-.165 
(.0203) 
-.193 
(.0023) 
-.042 
(.0026) 
GED (β7) .020 
(.0015) 
.001 
(.0019) 
.055 
(.0033) 
.021 
(.0026) 
.011 
(.0020) 
Firm-specific HC: level  1 (β8) 0.00& 
 
0.00& 0.00& 0.00& 0.00&
Firm-specific HC: level 2 (β9) .120 
(.0048) 
.044 
(.0031) 
.042 
(.0021) 
.082 
(.0017) 
.168 
(.0019) 
Firm-specific HC: level 3 (β10) .179 
(.0202) 
.112 
(.0190) 
.095 
(.0267) 
.125 
(.0292) 
.248 
(.0552) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 1 (β11) 0.00&
 
0.00&
 
0.00& 0.00& 0.00&
Occupation-specific HC: level 2 (β12) .020 
(.0013) 
.096 
(.0033) 
.0006 
(.0003) 
.00001 
(.00002) 
.033 
(.0018) 
Occupation-specific HC: level 3 (β13) .173 
(.0348) 
.132 
(.0320) 
.0006 
(.0004) 
.00001 
(.00003) 
.039 
(.0371) 
Probability that firm-specific human 
capital increases (λf) 
.998 
(.0193) 
.999 
(.0388) 
.999 
(.0194) 
.999 
(.056) 
.999 
(.0468) 
Probability that occupation-specific 
human capital increases (λf) 
.777 
(.0179) 
.463 
(.0238) 
.999 
(.0487) 
.190 
(.0361) 
.999 
(.0511) 
Error Standard Deviations Estimate Stan. Error    
True randomness in wages (σe) .306 .0080    
Non-Pecuniary firm match value (σξ) .00046 .0025    
Pecuniary firm match value (σψ) .275 .0131    
Extreme value parameter (τ) 3.234 .2107    
Notes:  & indicates the parameter is fixed at the stated value, not estimated. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Age is measured as true age minus 15.  
 
 
Table B2 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Across types 
Log-wage Intercepts     Mean Std dev 
Professional & 
managerial (μ1) 
9.677 
(.047) 
9.244 
(.046) 
8.974 
(.0552) 
9.014 
(.0639) 9.215 .276 
Craftsmen (μ2) 9.108 
(.048) 
8.878 
(.0596) 
8.660 
(.0477) 
8.735 
(.0566) 8.834 .173 
Operatives & 
laborers (μ3) 
9.346 
(.047) 
9.011 
(.0393) 
8.990 
(.0576) 
8.827 
(.0398) 9.050 .175 
Sales & clerical (μ4) 9.319 
(.052) 
8.947 
(.0574) 
8.873 
(.0595) 
8.762 
(.0562) 8.976 .198 
Service (μ5) 9.162 
(.062) 
8.841 
(.0658) 
8.836 
(.0615) 
8.854 
(.0769) 8.916 .135 
Within-type mean 9.322 8.984 8.866 8.838   
Within-type std dev .222 .159 .132 .109   
Non-pecuniary 
Intercepts       
Professional & 
managerial (φ1) 
-28.351 
(.1386) 
-25.340 
(.1251) 
-27.563 
(.1446) 
-37.208 
(.1731) -28.856 4.004 
Craftsmen (φ2) -21.335 
(.1120) 
-23.825 
(.1309) 
-21.005 
(.1123) 
-28.065 
(.1113) -23.051 2.575 
Operatives & 
laborers (φ3) 
-16.20 
(.0865) 
-14.541 
(.0828) 
-15.531 
(.0672) 
-20.905 
(.0937) -16.370 2.170 
Sales & clerical (φ4) -22.862 
(.2076) 
-19.902 
(.0938) 
-23.003 
(.1524) 
-26.975 
(.1362) -22.859 2.290 
Service (φ5) -19.345 
(.0880) 
-16.427 
(.0834) 
-18.804 
(.0913) 
-23.955 
(.1098) -19.214 2.452 
School (φs) 6.074 
(.0451) 
16.778 
(.1720) 
6.848 
(.0489) 
7.440 
(.0592) 9.353 4.423 
Within-type mean of 
(φ1-φ5) -21.618 -20.007 -21.181 -27.422   
Within-type std dev 
(φ1-φ5) 4.513 4.629 4.518 6.141   
Type Probabilities .233 
(.053) 
.260 
(.038) 
.332 
(.054) 
.175 
(.033) 
  
       
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B3 
Structural Model Estimates 
Variable Estimate Standard Error 
Discount factor (δ) .95&  
School Utility Flow   
Age (γs1) -3.666 .0757 
Age2/100 (γs2) 9.591 .1712 
Attending college (γs3) .671 .0179 
Attending graduate school (γs4) -2.264 .0459 
Years of high school (γs5) .569 .0168 
Years of college (γs6) .488 .0611 
School While Employed Utility Flow   
Age (γsw1) -5.271 .0894 
Age2/100 (γsw2) 24.74 .9561 
Years of high school (γsw3) 4.138 .0583 
Years of college (γsw4) 1.054 .0098 
GED Utility Flow   
Constant (γg1) -.950 .0068 
Age (γg2) -10.409 .8946 
Switching Costs   
Cost of moving to a new firm (firm to firm 
transitions) (α10) 
2.661 .0377 
School re-entry cost (γs7) -2.376 .0721 
Cost of moving to a new job from non-
employment (α9) 
2.658 .0407 
Costs of Working while Attending School   
Work in high school (γsw6) 6.497 .2385 
Work in college (γsw7) 11.548 .3794 
Work in graduate school (γsw8) 12.093 .4292 
Within-firm Job Offer Probabilities   
Offer from professional & managerial (π1) .249 .0144 
Offer from craftsmen (π2) .215 .0160 
Offer from operatives & laborers (π3) .226 .0155 
Offer from sales & clerical (π4) .224 .0198 
Offer from service (π5) .085 .0075 
      Notes:   & indicates the parameter is fixed at the stated value, not estimated.          
   
 
 
Table B4 
Structural Model Estimates 
            Occupations
Variable Professional 
& Managers 
Craftsmen Operatives & 
Laborers 
Sales & 
Clerical 
Service 
Employment Non-
Pecuniary Utility Flows:
     
Age (α1) 1.927 
(.126) 
2.035 
(.1373) 
.860 
(.1036) 
1.761 
(.1518) 
.850 
(.1720) 
Age2/100 (α2) -7.995 
(.5662) 
-10.098 
(.6794) 
-4.105 
(.4842) 
-10.689 
(.8518) 
-4.028 
(.5637) 
Education (α3) .773 
(.066) 
-.649 
(.0499) 
-.620 
(.0458) 
.248 
(.0403) 
.024 
(.0541) 
Occupation-Specific 
human capital (α4) 
5.532 
(.256) 
3.657 
(.2348) 
2.524 
(.3172) 
2.217 
(.4416) 
1.984 
(.3138) 
Firm-Specific human 
capital (α5) 
2.028 
(.0162) 
2.508 
(.0701) 
2.072 
(.0615) 
2.564 
(.0786) 
2.405 
(.0627) 
High school diploma (α6) .639 
(.1135) 
2.222 
(.1894) 
1.749 
(.1877) 
1.862 
(.1763) 
.756 
(.1592) 
College diploma (α7) 2.492 
(.2103) 
4.803 
(.3765) 
4.319 
(.3743) 
5.127 
(.3290) 
3.527 
(.2891) 
GED (α8) 1.422 
(.2490) 
1.718 
(.2189) 
2.335 
(.2234) 
1.711 
(.1933) 
2.982 
(.2072) 
Log-likelihood -15,422     
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: The Wage Equation – Discrete Levels vs. Quadratic Specifications 
 
Table C1: Quadratic vs. Discrete Level Log-Wage Equations 
Variable Quadratic Discrete Levels 
Firm tenure .0498 (.0076) --- 
Firm tenure2 -.0021 (.0009) --- 
Occupation experience .0202 (.0071) --- 
Occupation experience2 -.0003 (.0006) --- 
Firm tenure level 2 --- .0910 (.0141) 
Firm tenure level 3 --- .0872 (.0201) 
Occupation experience level 2 --- .0129 (.0116) 
Occupation experience level 3 --- .0643 (.0212) 
Observations 8,297 8,297 
R2 .3063 .3007 
Notes: Both regression equations are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. Tenure and 
experience are measured in years. The other explanatory variables included are identical to those in the structural 
log wage equation. The level dummy variables are defined as: Firm tenure level 1 = 1 if firm tenure>0, and Firm 
tenure level 2 = 1 if firm tenure>1, Occupation experience level 1 = 1 if occupation experience>0, and Occupation 
experience level 2 = 1 if occupation experience>1. 
 
                    Both regressions are estimated using OLS. Firm tenure and occupation experience are endogenous, so these 
relationships should not be interpreted as causal. The intent of this analysis is only to provide a simple descriptive 
analysis of the observed patterns in wage growth. The results show that the R2’s of the quadratic and discrete level 
specifications are extremely close, so both approaches provide approximately the same fit to the wage data observed 
in the NLSY. The two specifications perform equally well because in the NLSY data, most wage growth occurs 
early in jobs. It is important to remember that this analysis considers young men at the start of their career (ages 16-
30), so average firm tenure and occupation experience are only 2.2 years and 2.4 years, respectively. Given this 
feature of the data, it is perhaps not surprising that the discrete levels approach performs so well.  
 
      Another closely related point is that the discrete levels approach used in the OLS regressions is much more 
restrictive that the approach used in the structural model. In the structural model the rate of skill increase is not 
restricted during estimation, so that conditional on working for one year, it is possible for skills to rarely increase, or 
always increase. However, in the OLS equation the rate of increase is restricted to equal one, which means that 
workers always move to the next level after each year of work. The fact that many of the increase parameters are 
close to one in the estimated structural model does not signal an identification problem, it simply means that given 
three discrete levels, the best way to fit the wage data is by having skills increase quickly. Given the strong 
performance of the OLS discrete levels specification, it is not surprising that many of the estimated structural skill 
increase probabilities are close to one. 
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